'Mamlukisation' between social theory and social practice: an essay on reflexivity, state formation, and the late medieval sultanate of Cairo by Van Steenbergen, Jo
‘Mamlukisation’ between 
social theory and social 
practice:
An essay on reflexivity, 
state formation, and the 
late medieval sultanate of 
Cairo
Jo Van Steenbergen
Bonn, September 2015ISSN 2193-925X
A
SK
 W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
 2
2
ASK Working Paper
22
ASK Working Paper, ISSN 2193-925X 
Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg 
History and Society during the  
Mamluk Era (1250-1517) 
Heussallee 18-24 
53113 Bonn 
Editor: Stephan Conermann 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author’s address 
 
Jo Van Steenbergen 
 
Department of Languages and Cultures 
Ghent University 
Blandijnberg 2 
B-9000 Gent, Belgium 
Phone: ++32 (0)9 264 38 05 
Fax: ++32 (0)9 264 42 71 
Website: http://www.neareast.ugent.be/staff/JVS 
Mail: jo.vansteenbergen@ugent.be 
 
  
‘Mamlukisation’ between social theory and social practice: 
An essay on reflexivity, state formation, and the late medieval sultanate of Cairo 
 
by Jo Van Steenbergen 
 
Jo Van Steenbergen (PhD KULeuven [Belgium], 2003) is research professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies 
at Ghent University (Belgium). He engages with the social and cultural history of the pre-modern Islamic 
world, with a particular focus on the Islamic middle period (ca. 1000-1500), on Egypt and Syria, on the 
practices, discourses and structures of power elites in the sultanate of Cairo (ca. 1200-1517), and on the 
de/construction of grand narratives in Mamluk/Islamic history. He was a research fellow of the Netherlands-
Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC, 1997-8, 2003), a research assistant at KULeuven (Belgium) and the 
Flemish Science Foundation (FWO) (1998-2003), a lecturer at the University of St Andrews (2004-7), a 
senior research fellow at the Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg: History and Society during the Mamluk Era 
(1250-1517) (Bonn, 2014-15), and a visiting lecturer/professor at the British Museum and at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (London), at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Paris), and at the National 
University of Malaysia. Between 2009 and 2014 he was principal investigator of the ERC Starting Grant 
Project ‘The Mamlukisation of the Mamluk Sultanate. Political Traditions and State Formation in 15th-
century Egypt and Syria’. Jo Van Steenbergen is general editor of al-Masāq: the Journal of the Medieval 
Mediterranean (Routledge/Society for the Medieval Mediterranean), member of the programming committee 
of the IMC (Leeds, UK), and editorial board member of Mamluk Studies (Bonn UP/ASK), The Medieval 
Mediterranean (Brill) and Annales Islamologiques (IFAO). 
 
His recent publications include: 
 
- “Chapter Nine: Ritual, Politics and the City in Mamluk Cairo. The Bayna l-Qaṣrayn as a dynamic ‘lieu 
de mémoire’ (1250-1382).” In Court Ceremonies and Rituals of Power in Byzantium and the Medieval 
Mediterranean. Comparative Perspectives, eds. A. Beihammer S. Constantinou, M. Parani (The 
Medieval Mediterranean: Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400-1453 vol. 98) (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 
227-276. 
- “The Mamluk Sultanate as a Military Patronage State: household politics and the case of the Qalāwūnid 
bayt (1279-1382).” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 56 (2013), pp. 189-217. 
- (with W. Flinterman) “Al-Nasir Muhammad and the Formation of the Qalawunid State”, in Pearls on a 
String: Art in the Age of Great Islamic Empires, ed. A. Landau (Baltimore and Seattle: The Walters Art 
Museum and Washington University Press, 2015), pp. 101-127. 
- “Mamluk authorities and Anatolian realities: Jānibak al-Ṣūfī, sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy, and the story of a 
social network in the Mamluk/Anatolian frontier zone, 1435-1438.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 
(2015) (in press). 
- Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras – VIII (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta), eds. 
U. Vermeulen, K. D’hulster and J. Van Steenbergen (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2015) (in press). 
  
Table of contents: 
 
Abstract            1 
1. Introduction           2 
1.1. Whither Mamluk Studies?         2 
1.2. Whither the Mamluk State?         7 
2. Contemporary notions of dawla         10 
2.1. Dawlat al-Atrāk: narratives of order, continuity and agency    11 
2.2. From one dawla to another dawla: narratives of discontinuity and agency   16 
3. Toward an alternative approach: social practice, disciplinary power, and the state as a structural 
effect            23 
4. An alternative approach          27 
4.1. Reproduction, segmentation and integration, and their structural effects   27 
4.2. Transformation, the tanistric mode of reproduction, and political order as process in late 
medieval Egypt and Syria         31 
5. Epilogue: the Cairo Sultanate between dynastic and Mamluk political orders   35 
Bibliography            38 
 1 
Abstract 
 
This working paper is a reflexive essay that tries to think with and beyond one of the basic 
assumptions upon which the field of late medieval Syro-Egyptian ‘Mamluk’ studies is built: the 
idea that all late medieval Syro-Egyptian objects of study are by default first and foremost 
connected, circumscribed and distinguished by some agency of dominant military slavery, of 
Mamluk-ness. Acknowledging that there may be different ways to pursue such an epistemological 
exercise, this essay opts for re-imagining the historical agency of what traditionally tends to be 
subsumed under the phenomenon of the Mamluk state. It is argued that the notions of state in 
modern research and of dawla in contemporary texts remain an issue of related analytical 
confusion. Engaging with this confusion in the generalising fashion of a historical sociology of late 
medieval Syro-Egyptian political action, this essay proposes an alternative analytical model that is 
inspired by Michael Chamberlain’s prioritisation of social practices of household reproduction and 
by Timothy Mitchell’s related understanding of the state as a structural effect of practices of social 
differentiation. The proposed model sees sultanic political order —the state— as process, in 
constant flux as the structural effect and structuring embodiment of constantly changing practices of 
social reproduction, of elite integration and of political distinction, in contexts that range between 
multipolar and unipolar social organisation at and around Cairo’s court and its military elites. The 
essay ends with summarily suggesting from this model how the socio-culturally structured and 
structuring memories of dynastic political order that had remained politically dominant for most of 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were all but obliterated in the fifteenth century by a new 
layer of particularly ‘Mamluk’ socio-political meaning.1 
  
                                               
1 Before transforming into a ASK-Working Paper earlier versions of this essay were developed within the context of the 
project “The Mamlukisation of the Mamluk Sultanate (MMS): State Formation and the Structure of Politics in 
Fifteenth-century Egypt and Syria”, a research project financed by the European Research Council (ERC-Starting 
Grant, 2009-14, ERC StG 240865 MMS, Ghent University). We wish to thank the MMS-team members —Dr Kristof 
D’hulster and Dr Patrick Wing in particular— for useful discussions, suggestions and feedback. Earlier versions were 
presented as a seminar paper in the “Eurasian Empires Program” at Leiden University in January 2013, as a conference 
paper at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association in October 2013 (New Orleans), and as a discussion 
paper at various occasions in Paris, Bonn (Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg) and Cairo (American University in Cairo) in 
January, February and March 2015; I am grateful to all who engaged with it in any manner for constructive comments 
and feedback. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Whither Mamluk Studies? 
In the early sixteenth century the Florentine scholar and diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-
1527) explained the political organisation of the sultanate of Cairo up to his time in somewhat 
surprising papal terms: 
“The kingdom of the sultan (el regno del Soldano) […] being entirely in the hands of soldiers 
(soldati), it follows […] that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his friends. But 
you have to note that the sultan’s state (stato) is formed unlike all other principalities because it 
is similar to the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either a hereditary principality or a 
new principality. For it is not the sons (figliuoli) of the old prince who are the heirs (eredi) and 
become the lords, but the one who is elected (eletto) to that rank by those who have the 
authority (autorità) for it. And this being an ancient order (ordine antiquato), one cannot call it 
a new principality, because some of the difficulties in new principalities are not in it; for if the 
prince (principe) is indeed new, the orders of that state (li ordini di quello stato) are old and are 
ordered to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord (signore ereditario).” (Machiavelli, 
Chapter XIX) 
In this paragraph from Machiavelli’s manual for rulers, il Principe, the workings of politics in 
the sultanate are described in what may be defined as structuralist terms, as operating within a 
unique and socially transcendent political structure run by and for ‘the soldiers’ and upheld by the 
meritocratic ‘orders of the state’. In many ways, this early modern papal understanding’s genealogy 
of “the sultan’s state [that] is formed unlike all other principalities” goes back to late medieval 
European travellers’ varying representations of an exotically unique Egypt where the natural order 
of things would be standing upside down and where the Biblical story of the outsider Joseph’s rise 
from captivity and servitude to power would have remained a cherished political model.2 In the 
later eighteenth century Edward Gibbon (1737-94) reformulated these understandings in the stark 
orientalising discourse of his time and class by summarily claiming that “a more unjust and absurd 
constitution cannot be devised than that which condemns the natives of a country to perpetual 
servitude under the arbitrary dominion of strangers and slaves”.3 Finally, in the early twenty-first 
century, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama repeated this assessment in somewhat more 
neutralised synthesising terms, explaining that his readings into the contemporary field of study of 
the political history of the sultanate suggested to him that “the Mamluks ran a real state, with a 
centralized bureaucracy and a professional army — indeed, the army was the state, which was both 
a strength and a weakness.”4 
                                               
2 See especially Haarmann, “The Mamluk System of Rule in the Eyes of Western Travellers”; idem, “Joseph’s Law”, 
esp. 55-62; on the Joseph narrative being not just an external topos but also internal to Syro-Egyptian discursive 
realities, see Yosef, “Mamluks and their Relatives in the Period of the Mamluk Sultanate”, esp. 63-9 (‘“Joseph’s Law”: 
a Reassessment’). 
3 Quoted in Irwin, “Under Western Eyes”, 27; see E. Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury 
(London, 1912), 6: 377-8. 
4 Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 206. 
 3 
Today, scholarly approaches to the formation and transformation of Syro-Egyptian social and 
cultural organisation between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries have of course little to nothing 
to do with the particular writings of Machiavelli, of Gibbon, or even of Fukuyama. Nevertheless, as 
Fukuyama was keen to notice when reading into this particular strand of history, structuralist 
understandings such as Machiavelli’s arguably have remained the bottom line of most descriptive 
and analytical narratives within which scholarship on late medieval Egypt and Syria has operated. 
As both Gibbon’s and Fukuyama’s remarks suggest, that scholarship has somehow even remained 
indebted not just to variations of Machiavelli’s structuralism, but also to that long-standing meta-
narrative of a historically unique polity of military slaves, the mamlūks, dominating in Joseph’s 
footsteps the ranks of Machiavelli’s ’soldiers’ and his transcendent ‘orders of the state’ at the same 
time. In this timeless Mamluk meta-narrative the sultanate is actually assumed to have thrived on 
the remarkable combination of a continuous mercantile influx of new generations of mamlūks, a 
particular patrimonial bureaucratic (stato) and military (soldati) superstructure that favoured those 
mamlūks, and the normative practice of the political domination of those continuously rejuvenated 
ranks of slave soldiers (a practice also referred to as ‘one-generation-nobility’); in the same meta-
narrative the sultanate is explained to have entered into crisis and decline when the success of that 
particular combination of mercantile entrepreneurship, patrimonial structures, and political norms 
was gradually undermined by radically changing socio-economic and geopolitical circumstances. It 
may furthermore be argued that the gradual emergence in recent decades of a self-consciously 
distinctive field of ‘Mamluk Studies’ (also sometimes referred to as ‘Mamlukology’) is really above 
all a symptom of the long-standing, widespread and ongoing dominance of that Mamluk meta-
narrative in late medieval Syro-Egyptian social and cultural history.5  
Today this multifaceted and relatively young field of Mamluk Studies undoubtedly proves to 
be a highly successful and important contributing partner in the larger conglomerate of social and 
cultural studies of the pre-modern Islamic world. Compared to many other partners in this particular 
niche in the humanities, it does extremely well, both in terms of the continued growth of ‘Mamluk’ 
(written and non-written) sources and output (books, articles, web resources, theses, projects, 
conferences and meetings) as well as in terms of the ongoing sophistication of ‘Mamluk’ research 
tools, questions and insights that are being deployed, defined and reformulated. To pre-modern 
Islamic history standards Mamluk studies continues to be a booming field indeed, for which it 
becomes increasingly difficult and hazardous to make any claims of fully mastering it, of being a 
‘Mamlukologist’ in the true generalising and comprehensive sense of this neologism.  
                                               
5 This academic process of the rise of a separate Mamluk field that encompasses the study of all late medieval Syro-
Egyptian social, cultural, political and economic phenomena (and willy nilly distinguishes these phenomena 
epistemologically by suggesting a Mamluk common denominator) has more or less culminated in well-known, very 
successful and highly commendable academic initiatives such as the Chicago-based Mamluk Studies Resources web-
environment and its journal Mamlūk Studies Review (since 1997, and including an enriching and ongoing variety of 
survey publications on “Mamluk” art and architecture, archeology, historiography, numismatics, literature, society, 
religious policy and politics; on “Mamluk” Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Jerusalem and Cairo; and on “Mamluk studies” in 
general) (www.mamluk.uchicago.edu), the Bonn-based series Mamluk Studies and its wider institutional Mamluk 
research context, or various collective survey publications that present most useful stocktakings of a field that has been 
“booming” for more than two decades (e.g. Conermann, “Es Boomt!”; Ubi sumus? Quo vademus?). 
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Important, rich and inspiring as this simultaneous expansion and specialisation of ‘Mamluk’ studies 
may be, however, these two very welcome developments also tend to manifest themselves first and 
foremost in the shape of cumulating, accelerating, compartmentalising and forward-looking 
research dynamics that expand and enhance insights into ever more and ever more complex 
historical phenomena. In general, however, the basic assumptions upon which the field, these 
developments and their newly produced knowledge are built have never really been the object of 
any similar process of ongoing reflection.6 At least, this has never really happened, I would argue, 
for one of the most basic and fundamental among these assumptions: the ancient Mamluk meta-
narrative and its intrinsic presupposition that all late medieval Syro-Egyptian objects of study are by 
default first and foremost connected, circumscribed and distinguished by some agency of dominant 
military slavery, of Mamluk-ness.7 It is of course not necessarily problematic that the great majority 
of today’s late medieval Syro-Egyptian research continues to situate itself comfortably within such 
an —explicit or implicit— Mamluk framework. But some more critical reflection is certainly in 
place as to why this should not be problematic, and why it would remain a historically valid reflex 
for the expanding range and increasingly specialist nature of related research output to continue to 
try and square even the most careful and nuanced scholarly approaches to an ever more complex 
variety of social, economic, cultural and political phenomena with an overarching meta-narrative of 
Mamluk ‘soldiers’ and ‘orders of the state’. It is therefore argued here at the start of this essay that 
it is about time for Mamluk studies to also pursue some inward-looking and some critical thinking 
of what its object of study has been, is and may be, or rather of how the field has been, is and may 
be framing and defining both that object and itself; that the time has come to make more explicit the 
relationship between itself as a booming, expanding and specialising field of modern research and 
the plethora of phenomena that are being studied under its aegis; that time is overdue for some form 
of Mamluk reflexivity. 
This essay will therefore pursue such a reflexive exercise, not by adding to that expansion 
from or engagement in ever more specialised ways with the substantial corpus of empirical data, but 
rather by trying to think with and beyond the ever more populous and accelerating treadmill of 
Mamluk exploration. Thinking critically about the fundamental presuppositions, frameworks, 
parameters and paradigms that are being used to acquire knowledge from that empirical corpus, this 
essay hopes to contribute one way or another to the modest shift that is slowly occurring in the 
space that that treadmill has been occupying for so long now.8 It will not do so in order to make any 
head-on absolute claims about the intrinsic positive or negative value of any one way to pursue and 
acquire historical knowledge about late medieval Syro-Egyptian social and cultural organisation. It 
rather wishes to work from the assumption that there are always multiple ways and various 
outcomes possible, and it merely hopes to present its arguments in favour of one such a way. This 
will be done in the spirit that it is always worthwhile to consider such alternatives, or at least that it 
                                               
6 With —to a certain extent— the notable exceptions of late W. Clifford’s “Ubi Sumus?”; of Irwin’s more descriptive 
“Under Western Eyes”; and of St. Conermann’s call to redefine the discipline of “Mamlukology as Cultural Studies” 
and as “Historical Anthropology”, as explained in his “Quo Vadis, Mamlukology?”. 
7  With the very meaningful exception of Thorau, “Einige kritische Bemerkungen zum sogenannten ‘mamlūk 
phemonenon’”. 
8 See e.g. Conermann, “Quo Vadis, Mamlukology?”. 
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is enriching, even essential, to remain conscious of the fact that any of these alternatives’ 
knowledge outcomes always involves the making of well-informed choices that deserve to be made 
explicit, even at the very basic level of the choice in favour of the Mamluk meta-narrative. 
The working hypothesis that will serve as a (falsifiable!) premise for this essay’s argument is 
that late medieval Syro-Egyptian scholarship’s comfortable embeddedness in the Mamluk meta-
narrative indeed involves such a choice, and that the, often vaguely and unconsciously adopted, act 
of choosing the Mamluk way is always externally imposed upon rather than internally derived from 
this scholarship’s extremely diverse objects of study. It is argued here then that there always has 
been, and that there continues to be, a ‘Mamlukisation’ of both scholarship and objects of study, 
that both one way or another always tend to be constructed as ‘Mamluk’ subjects and objects of 
research from a Mamluk a priori. The point is then not that this process of ‘Mamlukisation’ would 
be necessarily wrong, but rather that it may well be extremely liberating and revealing to scratch 
beyond the surface of that Mamluk meta-narrative, to think outside of its pervasive frameworks and 
paradigms, and to try and reach for its objects of study along different pathways. 
It is furthermore proposed here that this reaching for different pathways may benefit from 
understanding the process of ‘Mamlukisation’ more precisely as scholarship’s choice to presuppose 
a bipolar Mamluk state-society construct as the defining framework for all late medieval Syro-
Egyptian research, as though state and society are connected in a dichotomous and time-less 
‘Mamluk’-ness. In general, imaginations of the state-society relation in late medieval Syro-Egypt 
have certainly moved on from Machiavelli’s and Gibbon’s simple one-directionality to descriptive 
or analytical acknowledgements of a more complex symbiosis.9 But the basic idea has always 
remained that of a mutually exclusive structural bipolarity of, on the one hand, a Mamluk State (or 
Empire, or Sultanate, or ‘order of the state’) —thought of as a socially transcendent, coherent and 
hegemonic political superstructure that was mainly manned and dominated by a ‘one-generation 
nobility’ of ‘soldati’, by mamlūks— and, on the other hand, a Mamluk Society —considered as a 
similarly bounded, organised and coherent separate structure of varieties of social groups that were 
unified in their domination, even their production, as some kind of Mamluk (but not mamlūk) 
subjects, by some external agency of that State of ‘the’ (predominantly mamlūk) ‘Mamluks’.10 
                                               
9 See e.g. Lev, “Symbiotic Relations”; Denoix, “Les sultanats”. 
10 This reminds also of Donald Richards’ regularly cited acknowledgement, published in 1998, that “throughout this 
piece I have used mamlūk to denote an individual who has that legal and social status and distinguished it from the 
adjective Mamluk (with a capital ‘M’ and without italics), which is used to describe the totality of the state, society and 
culture etc.” (Richards, “Mamluk amirs and their families and households”, 40), and his —to me at least— quite 
puzzling explanation for that distinction by the fact that “there is, of course, a social and cultural reality which we call 
Mamluk, which is far from being dependent on the input of those who were in the strict sense mamlūks.” (p. 33) (italics 
mine) Following Richards, this Mamluk totality now tends to be very easily defined from this perspective of what it is 
not, ie. mamlūk, all too easily forgetting to explain what a connecting and typifying Mamluk factor in social and cultural 
reality then actually would stand for, or at least what justifies the continued use of such a factor to group and explain 
realities which are “far from dependent” on a mamlūk input. The assumption seems to be that a valid meaning and 
justification derive from this particular Mamluk state-society dichotomy, where some socially transcendent Mamluk 
phenomenon —either the ‘Mamluk’ State or its ruling elite, ‘the Mamluks’— made for a Mamluk social and cultural 
reality; however, both Mamluk State and ruling elite again only appear here as existing as coherent historical categories 
in their construction through some residual factor of the same problematic mamlūk denominator (“Perhaps at times 
there is a tendency to confuse the mamlūk element with the Mamluk state as a whole” [p. 40]), which makes for a, 
indeed, quite puzzling circular argument. 
 6 
Again, the point is not that this dichotomous State-Society conceptualisation is necessarily wrong or 
invalid, but rather that it involves a particular hermeneutic choice that has fed directly into and has 
been fed by the process of ‘Mamlukisation’. Any intentions of reflexivity and of attempting to 
transform basic choices such as these into explicit instead of implicit acts of scholarship therefore 
have to start not just with trying to operate beyond this Mamluk a priori, but also with trying to 
think beyond this decisive structural bipolarity. There undoubtedly are quite a number of 
epistemological turns that may be taken to pursue this kind of problematisation.11 The one that will 
be taken by this reflexive essay aims at understanding differently the historical agency, or agencies, 
of what traditionally tends to be subsumed under the extremely vexed phenomenon of that Mamluk 
State.   
                                               
11 See e.g. Conermann, “Quo Vadis, Mamlukology?”; Von Hees, “Mamlukology as Historical Anthropology”. 
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 1.2. Whither the Mamluk State? 
It can be argued that also in its imagination of the Mamluk State the field of Mamluk studies 
tends to continue to adhere in explicit and implicit ways to some adapted form of Machiavelli’s 
(and, for that matter, Gibbon’s) understanding of the autonomous, transcendent and enduring nature 
of ‘the kingdom of the sultan’: “this being an ancient order (ordine antiquato), one cannot call it a 
new principality”. Similar understandings of the Mamluk State continue to prevail, as though it was 
some ancient, solid and grand manor with clearly arranged halls, corridors and rooms, but also with 
many annexes and an impressive demesne and with all kinds of inhabitants, tenants, servants and 
visitors. Today, the booming study of a growing body of available source material makes this 
manor look more like an intricate palace complex, for which extensions, renovation works, 
reorganisations of rooms and functions, changes in decoration and techniques, and phases of 
dilapidation have been and continue to be minutely recorded. In recent years, scholarly attention has 
moreover shifted from detailing this structural complex to prioritising the identification of 
inhabitants and their patterns of occupation. In general, however, the basic layout of this grand 
house of State —some systemic form of that combination of a patrimonial power structure (army 
and bureaucracy), a permanent influx of mamlūk military manpower, and a political culture 
organised around a Mamluk ‘one-generation-nobility’— is considered to have stood the test of 
time, even when its outlook and inhabitants regularly transformed.12 
Again, this longstanding understanding of the Mamluk State should not necessarily be 
problematic. It does however involve once more a particular hermeneutic choice that is highly 
interconnected with the Mamluk meta-narrative that this essay is trying to escape from. More 
importantly, perhaps, Mamluk studies generally tends to situate itself one way or another within a 
rather hazy theoretical framework for explaining what justifies the choice for that comfortable and 
familiar house of state. This tendency to awarding a truly defining historical agency (both in the 
Mamluk meta-narrative and in the bipolar state-society construction, and thus in all social and 
cultural realities that tend to be approached mainly through these prisms) to a phenomenon —the 
state— that carries a great variety of modern and pre-modern meanings, without really making 
presuppositions and choices of meanings explicit or without clearly accounting for the validity and 
complexity of implied causalities, can obviously be highly problematic.13   
Since the early 1990s (with roots going back to the late 1960s) there have been published a 
handful of very interesting and inspiring contributions to the political sociology of late medieval 
Egypt and Syria. Amid this general rule of theoretical vagueness they stand as important 
exceptions, which have been taken seriously by some and refuted by others. At the same time the 
complex particularities of their suggestions unfortunately also tend to be neglected by many. These 
rich engagements with the social theory of power relations, by Winslow Clifford and by Michael 
Chamberlain above all, share a prioritisation of patronage and negotiation or competition as key 
                                               
12 For most useful surveys and representatives of this approach, see Fuess, “Mamluk Politics”; Humphreys, “The 
Politics of the Mamluk Sultanate”; Loiseau, Les Mamelouks. 
13 See Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State. 
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social practices for their understandings of socio-political and cultural organisation.14 However, for 
all the important subtleties and novelties of their insights, they continue to operate one way or 
another within that same basic layout of this ancient Mamluk house of State, which persists in their 
understandings as some more or less abstract patrimonial structure within which historical action is 
to be situated.  
In State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamlūk Syro-Egypt Clifford approaches 
the state from the normative functionalism of “a widespread hierarchical administration of 
patronage …[that] contemporary Mamluk chroniclers referred to as the constitutional order (niẓām) 
of the state”. 15  In this analysis, the State stands as a structuralist Leviathan, dynamic on the 
microsocial level of elite interactions, but contained by a macrostructural context of an unchanging 
constitutional order (niẓām), imagined by Clifford as the hierarchical order of one coherent 
patrimonial power structure of “the Classical Mamluk state” and its ruling caste, “the Mamluks”.16 
In Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus Chamberlain takes a more practical 
and far more minimalist approach, because for him the state is merely an “abstraction” for an ad 
hoc apparatus —“the bureaucracy, […] such entities as the sultanate and the caliphate, […] the 
legal and ‘public’ aspects of power”— that is one among several instruments of control and 
organisation for the real agents in the political process: the military leaders (amirs) and their 
households.17 In this capacity, Chamberlain presents a tantalising line of thought, in which an 
                                               
14  Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice; Clifford, “Ubi Sumus?”; idem, State Formation. See also the 
integration of similar patronage-oriented approaches in the general surveys of Jonathan Berkey: “Culture and Society 
during the Late Middle Ages”, esp. 377-379; The Formation of Islam, esp. pp. 203-215 (“Common Patterns of social 
and political organization”); and in Sievert, “Family, friend or foe?”. 
15 Clifford, State Formation, p. 14. 
16 See esp. Clifford, State Formation, pp. 46-47, 54-62. “The Classical Mamluk state” returns repeatedly as a particular, 
structuralist and coherent category of analysis and of steadfast historical reality throughout the book, as on p. 46 (“The 
Classical Mamluk state was in essence a vast clientelistic structure or patronate”), p. 216 (“the balance-of-power-
oriented Classical Mamluk state”), and p. 220 (“the early Classical Mamluk state evolved as a dynamic but coherent 
political structure based on sociopolitical assumptions that were egalitarian yet hierarchical, collective yet utilitarian, 
and non-ascriptive as well as kin-oriented.”); “the Mamluks” equally make their appearance on numerous occasions as 
a coherent category of analysis and of some vague reality of collective action, as on p. 17 (“This collective sense of 
moral economy, guaranteed by the operation of niẓām, acted on the Mamluks as a macrostructural constraint, 
legitimating certain issues in the structuring of social power while limiting the degree and form of conflict over them”), 
p. 19 (The way in which the Mamluks structured their social power…”), p. 46 (“The Mamluks, however, avoided in 
their turn pre-state fissioning…”), and p. 47 (“For among the Mamluks the principal purpose of the state was similarly 
to mediate the downward flow of patronage and the upward flow of loyalty among multiple networks of paramilitary 
groups in order to neutralize unrestrained factional competition for resources and, thus, maintain state structure.”). The 
Leviathan parallel is suggested by Clifford himself, when he concluded that “Like Hobbes’ Leviathan, then, it might be 
said of the Mamluks that they craftily avoided disintegration through the same ‘introduction of that restraint upon 
themselves … (which) is the foresight of their own preservation’” (p. 220, quoting Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Macpherson 
[London, 1987], p. 223.) 
17 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, pp. 44-51, 60 (“The state in this period was not an impersonal entity, 
possessing specialized agencies, capable of formulating long-term strategies to pursue political goals. The politics of the 
city consisted of continuously renegotiated relationships among the ruling household, the important amīrs and their 
households, and civilian elites with specialized knowledge or religious prestige. If we are to speak of the state at all, it is 
as an abstraction of the personal ties of alliance, dependence, and dominance among these three groups. Rather than 
look for the mechanisms by which the state, as the primary embodiment and agent of power, diffused power from the 
top down, we need to understand a more complex situation. Studies of the bureaucracy, of such entities as the sultanate 
and the caliphate, of the legal and ‘public’ aspects of power, are undeniably useful in themselves. These, however, do 
not cover the entirety, or even perhaps the most important part, of relations among power, cultural practices, and the 
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absolute analytical prioritisation of elite households and their urban practices of social reproduction 
reduces the state to no more than a mere historiographical abstraction of particular and partial sets 
of social relations. The analytical simplicity of the traditional state-society bipolarity is thus 
exchanged for the complex agency of one multipolar local or regional system of urban social 
practice. However, simultaneous with this disappearance of the Mamluk state as a category of 
historical action, it makes its re-appearance in surprising ways as a category of social identification 
and periodisation. Throughout the book Chamberlain resorted to the random use of such 
generalising categories as “Ayyūbids and Mamlūks”, “Ayyūbid and Mamlūk warrior households”, 
and the “Ayyūbid and Mamlūk periods”. 18  Almost inadvertently, then, a residual, indeed 
’abstracted’, characteristic of that one Mamluk house of State —identified as though on a par with 
its alleged Ayyubid (lineage-based) dynastic predecessor— was arguably retained, the Mamluk 
meta-narrative continued to loom at the background of Chamberlain’s analyses, and the process of 
‘Mamlukisation’ also affected his thinking from social practice in ways that demonstrate parallels 
with how it impacted on Clifford’s structuralist approach, and on Mamluk studies’ approach of the 
state in general. In this essay’s search for reflexivity, for widening up the available options to 
choose from, and for exploring a different understanding of the historical agency, or agencies, of 
phenomena that traditionally tend to be subsumed under that unitary model of the Mamluk house of 
State, important theoretical advances, such as Clifford’s and Chamberlain’s, certainly have to be 
incorporated. But at the same time this essay will also need to try and move beyond them to achieve 
its purpose.  
                                                                                                                                                            
social strategies of groups. Such approaches have been useful in medieval Islamic history only with so much 
qualification that they lose the very precision they are intended to introduce.”) 
18 See, e.g., Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, p. 11 (“There is perhaps more literary, epigraphic, and 
material evidence on Damascus in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk periods than on any other city of the high medieval Middle 
East, with the possible exception of Cairo.”), p. 37 (“Damascus from Nūr al-Dīn through the Mamlūks”), p. 38 
(“Ideologically, Zangīds, Ayyūbids, and Mamlūks claimed the loyalties and resources of the cities as leaders of jihād…, 
agents of the caliph, and supporters of Islam.”), p. 40 (“Ayyūbid and Mamlūk rulers in principle denied their military 
supporters any autonomy or derived sovereignty.”), p. 44 (“Rule by warrior households and competition among them 
characterized both the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk periods.”), p. 48 (“Ayyūbid and Mamlūk urbanism was largely an 
intrusive and opportunistic architecture of single buildings.”), p. 60 (“Ayyūbid and Mamlūk warrior households brought 
few new political or administrative practices to Damascus.”). 
 10 
2. Contemporary notions of dawla. 
A useful starting point to both benefit from and move beyond these modern Mamluk, or 
‘Mamlukised’, narratives of political power and authority in late medieval Syria and Egypt may 
actually be found in late medieval usages of a key signifier for notions of political power and 
authority: dawla. In the course of the many centuries of Arabic and Islamic history the Arabic noun 
dawla has appeared as a generic qualifier in many different contexts of rule, with complex 
meanings that are not always easily rendered in other languages. In its essence, in these contexts of 
rule dawla is always —and continues to be— meant to refer to a particular political formation’s 
temporary local monopoly of violence and of access to resources.19 Often translated as “state”, this 
intended meaning reminds indeed of modern Weberian definitions of the concept of the state, 
focussing on issues of violence, of legitimacy, and of territoriality.20 But dawla is always also 
imbued with the transcendent, religious meaning of a God-given ‘turn’ —the literal translation of 
the Arabic noun dawla— or term of rule in the monotheist trajectory of human history.21 “In the 
mental structures and categories of perception and thought”22 of those who deal with dawla, and in 
the multiple subjectivities of their meaningful uses of and encounters with it, dawla therefore 
appeals to the idea of a universal “empire” as much as to that of a territorial “state”.23 Late medieval 
Syro-Egyptian communication, at least, entirely subscribes to these complex binary meanings. In 
fact, it operationalises dawla on two even more distinct semantic levels, the one appealing to some 
                                               
19 As the lexicographer Ibn Manẓūr repeated in the later thirteenth century in his Lisān al-ʿarab, “al-dawla and al-dūla 
similarly [mean] a turn [to share] in wealth, and [to prevail] in war; some say that al-dūla, with u, [refers to a turn to 
share] in wealth, and that al-dawla, with a, [refers to a turn to prevail] in war; some say [that] they are both [meaning] 
the same in both [cases], whether they be constructed with u or with a; some say [that] with u [the noun refers to a turn 
to share in wealth and to prevail war] in the hereafter, and with a in this world […]” (Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿarab, 
11:252); see also Lane’s similar rendering of wider discussions of the term al-dawla by Arabic lexicographers: “[…] 
and [particularly] … a turn (ةبْقُع) [to share] in wealth, and [to prevail] in war; as also ٌ َةلوُد: … or each is a subst. [in an 
absolute sense, app. as meaning a turn of taking, or having, a thing] … or  ٌةَلو  د is in wealth; and ٌ َةلْوَد is in war …this latter 
being when one of two armies defeats the other and then is defeated; or when one party is given a turn to prevail … 
over the other; … or ٌ َةلْوَد relates to the present life or world; and ٌ َةلوُد, to that which is to come: … and it is said that the 
former of these two words signifies prevalence, predominance, mastery, or victory; and the latter, the transition of 
wealth, blessing or good, from one people, or party, to another … — [In post-classical works, it signifies also A 
dynasty: and a state, an empire or a monarchy.] […]” (Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, p. 934-5) 
20 See Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State”, 4 [“I would say, using a variation around Max Weber’s famous formula, that 
the state is an X (to be determined) which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and 
symbolic (sic) violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population”]; Bourdieu’s 
reformulation was adopted and referred to in Karen Barkey’s Empire of Difference, in an equally highly relevant 
passage defining the notion of the state in an analytical context of Ottoman state formation (p. 32: “I adopt a Weberian 
definition of the state in which it is an organization that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force over a given territory, with the accent on ‘legitimate’.”). 
21  Lassner, The Middle East Remembered, 64-94 (“Chapter 3: Dawlah: Transformative Politics and Historical 
Memory”, concluding that “the medieval concept of dawlah can mean both a revolution that results in transformative 
change and a dynastic polity of truly imperial dimensions. … Because, from the very outset of Islam, the ummah was to 
have embraced all Muslims regardless of geographical setting or linguistic and ethnic background … a true dawlah, by 
its very nature, had to transform governance and reinforce proper religious practice at both the center and margins of 
Muslim rule, much as the Prophet attempted to do with his ‘revolutionary’ call.” [p. 89]). See also Lane, Lexicon, 934 
(“A turn, mutation, change, or vicissitude of time, or fortune … from an unfortunate and evil, to a good and happy, state 
or condition”) and his remark that “[In post-classical works, it signifies also A dynasty: and a state, an empire or a 
monarchy.]” (p. 935); Rosenthal, “Dawla”. 
22 Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State”, 4. 
23  For “universal empire” as “an elusive and much coveted prize among monarchs in history”, see Bang & 
Kolodziejczyk., Universal Empire. 
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universalising notion of structural continuity and the other to a particular reality of endless practical 
change. 
 
 2.1 Dawlat al-Atrāk: narratives of order, continuity and structure 
It hardly needs any repetition that the late medieval Syro-Egyptian polity that today tends to 
be referred to as the Mamluk sultanate was identified by contemporary historians and observers 
above all as the Dawlat al-Atrāk, the Dawlat al-Turk, or the Dawla al-Turkiyya.24 There were 
obviously substantial variations across authors, texts and genres about what that designation with 
Dawlat al-Atrāk actually stood for, in temporal as well as in spatial terms. Notwithstanding these 
variations in the detail, however, it is clear that all who used the label of Dawlat al-Atrāk meant it to 
evoke one way or another the correlation between the transcendent political continuity of a dawla 
and the Syro-Egyptian social order topped by a distinct military identity of Atrāk.25 In many ways 
this vague contemporary notion of the Dawlat al-Atrāk therefore parallels the equally vague modern 
conceptualisations of that Mamluk house of state as the “ancient order” of “the kingdom of the 
sultan … being entirely in the hands of soldiers”.  
Just as for many modern observers, also for contemporaries these vague meanings of the 
political order and legitimate continuity of the Dawlat al-Atrāk appeared in their most tangible and 
distinctive shapes when they were clearly arranged as the halls, corridors and rooms of the house of 
state. A telling illustration of how that vague idea of one, transcendent, and continuous political 
order was considered to materialise in concrete structural forms may be found in the political 
chronicle al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk miṣr wa-l-qāhira, by one of Egypt’s foremost historians of 
the fifteenth century, the courtier-scholar Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf Ibn Taghrī Birdī (1411-1470). One of 
the many descriptions of an accession to the throne of the Dawlat al-Atrāk in this chronicle 
concerns the beginning of the reign of al-Muʾayyad Aḥmad (ca. 1431-1488), who briefly succeeded 
his father, sultan al-Ashraf Īnāl, in 1461. 
He is the 37th sultan among the rulers of the Turks and of their offspring (min mulūk al-Turk 
wa-awlādihim) in the Egyptian domains, and [he is] the thirteenth [sultan] among the 
Circassians and their offspring. He was made sultan on Wednesday 14 Jumādā l-Ūlā of the 
year 865 [25 February 1461]…. In the early morning of this day, al-Zaynī Khushqadam al-
Aḥmadī al-Ṭawāshī al-Sāqī al-Ẓāhirī descended [from the Cairo citadel] to summon the four 
[chief] judges to the citadel, while somebody else descended to summon the caliph, al-
Mustanjid bi-llāh Yūsuf. Each of them hurried to ascend to the citadel, until all had ascended 
and taken a seat in the vestibule of al-Duhaysha palace at the Citadel of the Mountain. The 
                                               
24 Ayalon, “Baḥrī Mamluks, Burjī Mamlūks”. See also Ayalon, “The European-Asiatic Steppe”, 47-48; Lewis, “Egypt 
and Syria”, 214; and most recently Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, 182 (“Le sultanat mamelouk d’Egypte et de Syrie n’a 
cessé d’être la ‘dynastie des Turcs’ (dawlat al-turk, dawlat al-atrak) aux yeux de ses sujets de langue arabe.”) 
25 This identity is explained today either as a discursively constructed and inclusive identity of political distinction 
through some form of ‘Turkishness’ (Richards, “Mamluk amirs and their families and households”; Van Steenbergen, 
“Nomen est Omen?”), or as an exclusive political identity derived from shared Turkic ethno-linguistic and servile 
origins (Ayalon, “Baḥrī Mamluks, Burjī Mamlūks”; Yosef, “Dawlat al-Atrāk or Dawlat al-Mamālīk?”); Julien Loiseau 
recently formulated a medial position, arguing for a more inclusive “ethnicisation” from the end of the fourteenth 
century onwards of an essentially exclusive identity, the basic ingredients of which were, according to him, “conversion 
to Islam, professional ‘turkishness’, mamlūk filiation” (Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, 196-200, 205). 
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caliph and His Excellency, the commander-in-chief Aḥmad, sat down at the head of the 
council, while the judges were each seated according to their ranks. They discussed the 
accession to the sultanate of al-Malik al-Muʾayyad [Aḥmad], because his father, al-Malik al-
Ashraf Īnāl, had not yet designated him as his successor in the sultanate. The qāḍī Muḥibb al-
Dīn b. Shiḥna, the head of the royal chancery, said that he should be appointed in the sultanate 
representing his father as long as the latter was alive and independently after his demise. 
Those present did not approve of this. All then stood up and entered the Duhaysha palace, in 
which al-Malik al-Ashraf Īnāl was lying, in order to hear what he had to say regarding the 
installation of his son Aḥmad. The amīr Yūnus, the executive secretary, addressed him more 
than once concerning the succession, but [the sultan] was unable to respond. They all stood 
beside him for quite some time, while he said nothing. Then all left the palace and returned to 
his son, al-Muʾayyad, who was sitting at the window in the vestibule of al-Duhaysha. They 
explained the situation to him, and then they returned to al-Malik al-Ashraf a second time, 
and repeated the question to him. The sultan kept silent, until, after some time, he spoke, 
saying in Turkish, ‘Ughlim ughlim!’, meaning, ‘My son, my son!’ Those present said that this 
was a sign of the vesting of his son, and that he was not capable of saying any more than this. 
They then immediately left and returned to the [vestibule of] the Duhaysha, where the head of 
the royal chancery occupied himself with the oath-taking from the amīrs. Those amirs who 
were present swore clear and binding oaths, and none of them undertook it to pretend to swear 
or to cheat, as they were not capable of that, and also [because] the one whom allegiance was 
sworn to was intelligent and the head of the royal chancery was a knowledgeable man. 
Among the things that were sworn there was that they would once perform the ḥajj on foot in 
these or those circumstances, divorce [their wife], manumit [their slaves], etcetera.  
Once the oath-taking was done and [once] allegiance was sworn, every one of the amīrs, of 
the favourites, and of the notables stood up and hurried to put on the kalaftā[-hat] and the 
white tatarī[-coat], as was the custom. The black caliphal robe of honour for the sultanate was 
then brought forward, and a black silk turban was winded for him. Then his Excellency al-
Shihābī rose to his feet, he immediately donned the robe and the turban, and he mounted the 
ceremonial horse with a golden saddle and a brocaded headgear at the gate of al-Duhaysha. 
The amirs and the notables walked in front of him through the al-Ḥawsh gate, until they 
passed by the gate of the Sultan’s Palaces. There, he was met by the royal chanters 
(jāwūshiya) and by the warden of the armoury (zardkāsh) bringing the royal sunshine (“the 
dome and the bird” - al-qubba wa-l-ṭayr) and the [other] emblems of sovereignty with him. 
With the sultan’s permission, the amīr Khushqadam al-Nāṣirī al-Muʾayyadī, the amīr of arms, 
took the royal sunshine and carried it over his head while walking. The sultan proceeded in a 
royal procession of great and extraordinary grandeur, with all the amīrs and the qāḍīs walking 
in front of him, except for the caliph, al-Mustanjid bi-llāh (he [did not walk but] mounted one 
of the sultan’s horses and he proceeded with it for some strides; then he had to dismount, for 
it was too strong for him). [The sultan] proceeded thus, until he dismounted at the gate of the 
Sultan’s Castle of the Citadel of the Mountain. He entered and he sat down on the royal 
throne [inside the Castle]. Never have [my] eyes witnessed someone prettier and more 
handsome than he was in his black robe of honour, for he was of a blond complexion while 
the robe was black, [leaving an impressive impression] in combination with his attractive 
bearing* and his tall stature (it may well be that there was nobody of the troops at that time 
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who came close to him in tallness of stature). When he had taken a seat onto the royal throne, 
the amirs kissed the ground before him and the drums were beaten. Instantly it was 
proclaimed in the streets of Cairo that one should pray for al-Malik al-Muʾayyad Abū l-Fatḥ 
Aḥmad. Simultaneously, he bestowed a robe of honour with a white-and-green double-sided 
silken overcoat with bands of embroidered decoration upon the caliph, and he gave him a 
horse with golden saddle and embroidered headgear, and he donated him [as iqṭāʿ] the village 
of Minbāba in al-Jīza.26 
 
Different sets of basic structural forms that made for the Dawlat al-Atrāk —including these 
officials, places, customs, apparel and rituals that performed in Ibn Taghrī Birdī’s narrative the 
transformation of Aḥmad from royal son into the 37th sultan of the dawla’s memory— appeared in 
varieties of ways in all of the era’s historiographical texts, often structuring key moments in the 
narratives, as in the case of Aḥmad’s and of many others’ successions to the sultanate, but also at 
times of political conflict and of other transitions and transformations of power. Often, these 
structural forms even appeared at key moments in the texts themselves, such as at the beginning of 
particular textual units, especially those covering an annal or a reign, as in one of the most 
important works of Syro-Egyptian history, the kitāb al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk by the 
Egyptian scholar Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī (ca. 1363-1442). In the last of the four volumes of this 
foremost annalistic chronicle of late medieval Egypt’s political and socio-economic history almost 
every year’s chronographic narrative opens with explicitly identifying some of these more concrete 
forms of political order and continuity, structuring the text as much as the social realities that it was 
claiming to represent. By way of example, the following description of the year’s hierarchies of 
power open the annal for the year 837 (1433-1434):  
“At the beginning of this year the caliph of the time is al-Muʿtaḍid bi-llāh Dāwud; the sultan 
of Islam in Egypt, Syria, the Hijaz and Cyprus is al-Malik al-Ashraf Barsbāy; and the grand 
amīr is Sūdun min ʿAbd al-Raḥmān; the amīr of arms Aynāl al-Jakamī, the amīr of the 
council Aqbughā al-Timrāzī, the head of guards the amīr Timrāz al-Qirmishī, the amīr of the 
horse Jaqmaq, the executive secretary Urkumās al-Ẓāhirī, the grand chamberlain Qurqmās, 
the vizier and major-domo Karīm al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Karīm Ibn Kātib al-Manākh, the 
confidential secretary Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn al-Bārizī, 
the controller of the army the qāḍī Zayn al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Bāsiṭ —he is the mighty effective 
manager of the dawla—, and the controller of privy funds Saʿd al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ibn Kātib 
Jakam. The chief judges remained [as before], and the viceroys and the rulers of the different 
regions are as they have been mentioned for the preceding year.”27 
 
                                               
26 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 218-220. For the English translation of Arabic names for official positions and places in this 
and in subsequent text fragments, I followed Popper, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, esp. 115-120. 
27 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4:902. The first occurrence of this type of political list in the Sulūk is at the beginning of the annal 
for the year 809 (1406-1407) (al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4:27), which is the first full annal in book four (which only begins in 
Rabīʿ I 808 [September 1405], with the accession of sultan ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz). 
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The same structuring technique had been applied about a century earlier in another grand 
annalistic work of Syro-Egyptian history, the multi-volume Kanz al-durar wa-jāmiʿ al-ghurar by 
Ibn Aybak al-Dawādārī (fl. 1309-1335). In this literary chronicle’s eighth and final volume —
entirely dedicated to the reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (r. 1310-1341), “the one with 
whom the throne of kingship was honoured and whom the dawlat al-turk had the good fortune of 
receiving”— the annals reproduce similar opening hierarchies of power, as in the case of the annal 
for the year 735 (1335), which begins as follows: 
“The caliph is the imām al-Mustakfī bi-llāh Abū l-Rabīʿ Sulaymān, Commander of the 
Faithful, and our lord the most powerful sultan, al-Malik al-Nāṣir, is the sultan of Islam —
may God prolong his days until the end of time […]. The amīr chamberlain is the amīr Badr 
al-Dīn Amīr Masʿūd b. Khaṭīr —may God be good to him and may He augment his 
beneficence towards him—, his brother the amīr Sharaf al-Dīn Maḥmūd being a chamberlain, 
just as the amīr Sayf al-Dīn Jārīk; the amīr of the adjutants is the amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Ṣārūjā, 
and the speaker for issues of the vizierate that concern the collection of funds from the 
departmental bureaus is the amīr Sayf al-Dīn Alakuz al-Nāṣirī, with the assistance of Badr al-
Dīn Luʾluʾ; and the amīr Rukn al-Dīn al-Aḥmadī is an amīr of the armour bearers, just as the 
amir Sayf al-Dīn Urum Bughā and the amīr Sayf al-Dīn Balabān al-Ḥasanī; the amīr Sayf al-
Dīn Āqbughā ʿAbd al-Wāḥid is a major-domo, with the command over the sultanic mamlūks 
—may God almighty bless them— being joined to him after the dismissal of the eunuch 
ʿAnbar al-Saḥratī; and the controller in the victorious departmental bureau for the victorious 
armies is the qāḍī Makīn al-Dīn b. Qarwīna. The viceroys in Syria are the amir Sayf al-Dīn 
Tankiz, the lord of the amīrs, in well-protected Damascus, …; the amir ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn 
Alṭunbughā in Aleppo, the amir Jamāl al-Dīn Āqūsh Nāʾib al-Karak in Tripoli, the amīr Sayf 
al-Dīn al-ḥājj Aruqṭāy in Safed, and the amir Sayf al-Dīn Ṭaynāl in Gaza. The rulers of the 
different regions are, in Mecca, …, and the lord of Medina, … and the lord of Yemen … , and 
the lord of Mardin …, and the lord of Ḥamā …, and the lord of the region from Iraq up to 
Khurasan is the king [Ilkhan] Abū Saʿīd … and the lord of the lands of Barka [of the Mongol 
Golden Horde] is the king Uzbak … and the other kings of the Mongols are as they and their 
names have been mentioned for the preceding years.”28 
 
Almost two centuries later, in the early sixteenth century, in one of the sultanate’s last 
Egyptian chronicles, the Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr fī waqāʾiʿ al-fuhūr, by Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Iyās 
(1448-ca. 1524), the same type of hierarchies of power again provided some years’ reports with the 
appearance of textual and historical order and continuity, as in the opening lines of the annal for the 
year 922 (1516), the year of the dawla’s succumbing to military conquest from the Ottoman north.  
The first day of Muḥarram was on a Monday. On that day, the caliph of the time was the 
Commander of the Faithful al-Mutawakkil ʿalā llāh Muḥammad, son of the Commander of 
the Faithful al-Mustamsik bi-llāh Yaʿqūb —may both their glory become high; on that day, 
                                               
28 Ibn Aybak al-Dawādārī, Kanz al-Durar, 9: 379-380; for the dawlat al-turk citation, see 8: 7 (I am grateful to Reuven 
Amitai for drawing my attention to a similar passage in this chronicle). 
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the sultan of Egypt was al-Malik al-Ashraf Abū l-Naṣr Qānṣawh min Baybirdī al-Ghūrī —
may his victory be great. As for the four lord qāḍīs: the Shafi’i qāḍī was the chief judge 
Kamāl al-Dīn al-Ṭawīl, the Hanafī qāḍī was the chief judge Ḥusām al-Dīn Maḥmūd, son of 
the chief judge Saray al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Barr b. al-Shiḥna al-Ḥalabī, the Malikite qāḍī was the 
chief judge Muḥyī l-Dīn Yaḥyā, son of the chief judge Burhān al-Dīn al-Damīrī, and the 
Hanbali qāḍī was the chief judge Shihāb al-Dīn al-Futūḥī —may God strengthen Islam with 
them. As for the number of the amīrs commanders, their number on that day was twenty-six 
amīrs commanders of 1,000, including six holders of office; they were the atābak Sūdūn min 
Jānī Bak al-ʿAjamī as grand amīr, (the position of amīr of arms was vacant on that day) the 
amīr Urkmās min Ṭurabāy as amīr of the council, the noble al-Nāṣirī Muḥammad —scion of 
the august prince— as amīr of the horse, the amīr Sūdūn b. Yashbak al-Dawādārī as head of 
guards, the amīr Anaṣbāy min Muṣṭafā as grand chamberlain, and the amir Ṭūmān Bāy min 
Qānṣawh, the sultan’s nephew, as grand amīr executive secretary, combining the grand 
executive secretaryship with the grand major-domoship, and as grand inspector of the 
provinces. As for the amīrs commanders not holding an office, they were: …. As for the 
viceroys in the regions of Syria and Aleppo: the noble al-Sayfī Sībāy min Bukhtujā was 
viceroy of Damascus, the noble al-Sayfī Khāyir Bak min Malbāy was viceroy of Aleppo, 
Timrāz al-Ashrafī was viceroy of Tripoli, Jān Birdī al-Ghazzālī was viceroy of Hama, Yūsuf 
—who had been viceroy of Jerusalem— was transferred to the viceroyship of Safed, and the 
viceroy of Gaza was Dūlāt Bāy —the viceroyship of Jerusalem had been added to it—, and 
al-Karak was part of the viceroyship of Gaza. As for the amīrs of forty who were holders of 
office, they were … As for the amīrs who were heads of guards, they were many and we will 
not detail them here for fear of length. As for the holders of office from the leading officials 
and turban-wearers, they were the lord and qāḍī al-Muḥyī Maḥmūd b. Ajā al-Ḥalabī, the 
noble confidential secretary and the controller of the bureau of documents —may God the 
Exalted strengthen him—, his assistant the lord al-Shihābī Aḥmad b. al-Jīʿān, the lord and 
qāḍī Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Qādir, known as al-Qaṣrawī, the controller of the noble army, al-
Zaynī ʿAbd al-Qādir and his brother Abū Bakr, the sons of al-Malikī, the two accountants of 
the bureau of the noble army, the lord al-ʿAlāʾī ʿAlī b. al-Imām, controller of the noble privy 
funds and controller of pious trust foundations, and the vizierate was vacant at this time, due 
to the dismissal of Yūsuf al-Badrī … and other such officials and notables of the dawla. As 
for the notables from among the eunuchs … During this year the sultan’s private retinue grew 
to about 1,200 favourites, [chosen] from among his purchased [mamlūks]; a large contingent 
from them were established as holders of offices, including as executive secretary assistants, 
as arms bearers, as armourers, as equerries, as cup bearers and in all kinds of similar offices. 
During this year the number of amirs of forty and of ten grew beyond that of 300 amirs. The 
army had grown, but the regular income from fiscal tribute was low.29 
 
                                               
29 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr, 2-5. 
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These recurrent engagements with a particular political order by al-Maqrīzī, Ibn al-Dawādārī, 
and Ibn Iyās, by many of their colleagues,30 and by their fourteenth-, fifteenth- and sixteenth-
century Arabic readerships, bespeak the shared imaginations of hierarchies of power that structured 
not just their wider Muslim worlds, but also their closer Syro-Egyptian surroundings.31 These local 
hierarchies are presented as having the potential of a substantial staff turnover from one year to 
another, and thus as requiring regular informational updates. They also appear as acquiring new and 
substantially adapted guises between the early fourteenth and the early sixteenth centuries. But all 
three randomly chosen lists, as well as Ibn Taghrī Birdī’s re-enactment of Aḥmad’s enthronement in 
1461, also display continuities that may be interpreted as the basic contours of the forms that 
embodied, for contemporary historians and observers, the longue durée of that particular political 
order of the Dawlat al-Atrāk. The supreme sultanate and the military amirate appear thus time and 
again as this order’s key institutions of politico-military leadership, while the Cairo caliphate and 
the Shari’a, as upheld by qāḍī-representatives of the four ‘schools’ of Sunni Islam, appear as its key 
value systems. With some imagination, these key structural forms may even be expanded with 
Cairo’s Citadel of the Mountain and its many local offshoots in Damascus, Aleppo and elsewhere 
as key sites of power, with tributary agricultural production and trans-regional trade (including in 
mamlūks) as defining, politically crucial economic and military resource flows, and with narratives 
of religious championship and military victory as informing the legitimating myths of this particular 
political order’s origins and continuity.  
It may actually even be argued that certain combinations of these key features were reproduced as a 
subtext of structuring political and textual order not only for contemporary historiography and 
related writings, but also for important parts of some of the gigantic encyclopaedic and 
administrative normative texts of the era, such as the Masālik al-abṣār by Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī 
(d. 1349), the Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā by al-Qalqashandī (d. 1418), and perhaps even the Nihāyat al-arab by 
al-Nuwayrī (d. ca. 1332).32 Many of these texts’ components were informed by the same sets of 
structural forms, from the symbolic bodies of sultanate and amirate, over geographies of power, 
mechanisms of resource management, and narratives of championship and victory, to local 
                                               
30 Hierarchically structured (and structuring) shorter, longer and summary opening lists such as these may be found in a 
variety of other annalistic chronicles, such as in the Damascene scholar Ibn Kathīr’s Bidāya wa-l-nihāya (Ibn Kathīr, al-
Bidāya wa-l-nihāya, 14: 2, 49, 60-1, 111, 176, 180, 184, 187, 191, 201, 209, 212, 218, 221, 225, 229, 233, 237, 241, 
247, 249, 251-2, 253, 256-7, 258, 264, 267, 275, 290, 297, 305, 313), in al-ʿAynī’s ʿIqd al-jumān (al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd al-
jumān, 85-94, 173-4, 191-2, 217-9, 245-7, 293-4, 309-10, 351-3, 399-400, 425-6, 441, 453, 465, 479-81, 493-4, 509, 
543, 557-8, 569-70, 591-3, 619, 635, 651), or in al-Ṣayrafī’s Nuzhat al-nufūs (al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-nufūs, 3: 17-8, 40-1, 
64-5, 98-9, 113-5, 143-4, 246-7, 271, 364-6). 
31 It is useful in this context to remind of Khalidi’s characterisation of later medieval Arabic historiograhical writings as 
siyasa-historiography, as taking a much more particular interest in local politics and their presentist concerns than 
before, (Khalidi, Arabic Historical Thought, 182-231); Khalidi even went so far as to claim that late medieval “History 
as Siyasa meant history as an imperial bureaucratic chronicle, authoritative, comprehensive, and designed primarily for 
administrative use” (p. 233). 
32 For the interesting argument “that the rise of encyclopaedism in this period was emblematic of a certain intellectual 
ethos, a systematic approach to the classification of knowledge which emerged in the discursive context of a rapidly 
centralizing imperial state”, focusing on al-Nuwayrī’s Nihāya in particular, see Muhannā, “Encyclopaedism in the 
Mamluk Period”; for al-Qalqashandī, see Van Berkel, “The Attitude towards Knowledge in Mamluk Egypt”; idem, “A 
Well-Mannered Man of Letters or a Cunning Accountant”. 
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manifestations of caliphate and Sunni Islam, all creating appearances of normative order and 
continuity in such texts as much as in the realities that they alleged to circumscribe.  
Reaching for and at the same time claiming to explain or prescribe these social realities, 
historiographical and related texts obviously meant those extremely detailed literary reproductions 
of the structural forms of the Dawlat al-Atrāk to have some bearing on this dawla’s formal 
manifestations in all kinds of other (non-literary) socio-cultural contexts, including in political 
ceremonies and in practices of social distinction. However, it also has to be acknowledged that we 
mainly know about the latter contexts by way of the particular lens of the former only, from Ibn 
Taghrī Birdī’s detailed transition accounts, over the functional listing of political hierarchies in all 
kinds of texts, to al-Nuwayrī’s sub-chapter “on secretaryship and its different branches of duties and 
writings”. Assessing the level of success in a particular literary work’s —or in a particular set of 
literary works’— reaching for social reality appears then as a sheer impossible task, for the simple 
reason that the choice of deciding where the structuring order of the Dawla began and where that 
imposed by the author ended appears as extremely vexed. This should not, however, necessarily be 
framed as a problematic opposition between social realities and their textual representations, 
between actors and authors, or between fact and fiction. Both perspectives are actually highly 
interconnected in the meanings that were ascribed to the forms that were deployed for structuring 
social order in texts and in these texts’ wider social contexts alike. These are two sides of the same 
coin of contemporary political discourse, of seeing, making and representing the proper social order 
of the Dawlat al-Atrāk.  
In fact, in spite of many texts’ keen eye for details in the representation of the structural forms 
of the Dawlat al-Atrāk, the limits of that structuring order simultaneously seem to appear as rather 
vague and elusive in its descriptive and prescriptive as well as in its related manifestations. The 
views of hierarchy and order that transpire from al-Maqrīzī’s, Ibn Aybak’s and many others’ 
structuring listings do not in fact impose any strict boundaries between this Syro-Egyptian Dawlat 
al-Atrak and its wider West-Asian (or even wider) environment of multiple local and regional 
“rulers” (mulūk). The latter are surely no incompatible “Other” in this particular discursive corner 
of contemporary writings. All were rather subsumed into one imagined trans-regional hierarchy of 
(West-Asian or even wider) legitimate political leadership, which included Syrian viceroys as well 
as all kinds of Mongol, post-Mongol and other leaders, and which was topped by the royal persona 
of the sultan. In its very essence the Dawlat al-Atrāk appears thus as an avatar of how late medieval 
Syro-Egyptian authors and their courtly audiences thought about their wider political world, and of 
how they tried to reach for, to structure, to order and to claim a place for themselves in that world, 
in their texts as well as in the realities in which these texts, authors and audiences participated. As 
this manifestation of a highly interconnected particular way of seeing, saying, doing and meaning 
things on an imagined canvas of the wider political world, the Dawlat al-Atrāk appears as existing 
first and foremost as an important marker for and participant in a particular contemporary discourse 
of late medieval Syro-Egyptian political order, which imposed, performed and accommodated itself 
in changing varieties of ways through the structural forms by which it was pre- and described in any 
type of cultural and social media. 
Given the Dawlat al-Atrāk’s almost self-evident trans-regional dimensions this contemporary 
political discourse presents itself in remarkably self-evident ways as participating in widely shared 
leadership practices and value systems. Obviously, in the wider world of Mongol and post-Mongol 
West-Asia Syro-Egyptian recruitment of slave soldiers appeared as pertaining to the order of much 
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wider things —the regular employment of military outsiders—, and political leadership was almost 
always acquired, whatever one’s origins and background. The Syro-Egyptian Dawla was therefore 
not really singled out in this particular discourse for the servile origins of substantial parts of its 
manpower and leadership, and the (acclaimed or real) distinctive Turkish identity of the latter 
leadership was not fundamentally different from that of other West-Asian political elites.33 This 
Dawla was rather considered to stand out and to legitimately top the region’s political hierarchies 
for its continued emanation from one political centre, represented as organised around the caliph, 
the sultan and his ‘Turkish’ court, as territorially rooted in the Cairo citadel, and as deploying 
particular and evolving sets of institutions, identities, resources, sites and value systems that all 
remained in some coherent manner connected to this late medieval regional centre of political 
continuity and gravity. In the discursive political order of things, as imagined, created and recreated 
by late medieval Syro-Egyptian authors as well as by their courtly audiences, the vague meanings 
of the political order and legitimate continuity of the Dawlat al-Atrāk did not just appear in 
participants’ textual, symbolic, physical, or otherwise, arranging and re-arranging of the halls, 
corridors, rooms and other structural forms of the house of state. They also derived from these 
varying structural arrangements’ combination with the Dawla’s successful claim of being the 
Sultanate of Cairo. In this claim, Cairo does not just represent the largest and most densely 
connected urban crossroads in the highly segmented political realities of late medieval West-Asia 
and North-Africa. It also represents the far more universalist idea of a subjugating centripetal force 
pulsating from an unrivalled urban landscape and appearing as capable of transcending all possible 
boundaries, whether imagined or real. This impression of a transcendent socio-cultural quality 
certainly emerges from contemporary testimonies, such as by the North-African scholar and official 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406), who arrived in Egypt in late 1382. In his autobiographical 
travelogue, al-Taʿrīf bi-Ibn Khaldūn wa-riḥlatihi gharban wa-sharqan, his reconstruction of the 
memories of his and his contemporaries’ first impressions of Cairo reproduces indeed that imposing 
and intimidating character of this metropolis as existing far beyond any local realities and 
imaginations. 
Coming to Cairo on 1 Dhū l-Qaʿda [6 January 1383], I saw the metropolis of the world, the 
garden of the earth, the hive of nations, the anthill full of people, the portal of Islam, and the 
seat of royalty, with palaces and portals marking out its skyline and with khānqāhs and 
madrasas providing light over its hinterland; [I saw how] it illuminates the moons and the 
                                               
33 This also reminds of the related comparative observation made by Chamberlain that “the difference between the 
political-military organization of the Middle East and the Latin West was not so much the employment of slave soldiers 
that scholars have seen as emblematic of high medieval Middle Eastern politics. It lay rather in the relatively greater 
preponderance in the Middle East of garrisoned commands of ethnic outsiders who were recruited with cash. The 
recruitment of slave soldiers in large numbers —as original and distinctive as it is— may thus be a special case of a 
wider phenomenon. The long history of Europeans’ horror at slave rule may have reflected an even greater terror —the 
uncoupling of descent and status in a society more monetized than their own.” (Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social 
Practice, pp. 45-46). See also Loiseau, who presents a similar analysis (“les Mamelouks partageaient dans une certaine 
mesure l’habitus de la plupart des sociétés politiques qui dominaient à la même époque l’Orient de l’Islam, celui 
d’aristocraties militaires de cavaliers, retranchées dans des citadelles urbaines, étrangères par la langue comme par 
l’ethnie à la majorité de leurs sujets, n’ayant guère en commun avec eux que la pratique de la religion musulmane.”) 
(Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, p. 144) 
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stars by means of its scholars, [and how] it has made the shore of the Nile look like the river 
of paradise and like the stream of the waters of heaven, its running water quenching their 
thirst a first time and a second time and its torrent gathering fruits and benefits for them. I 
walked around in the overcrowded alleys of the town centre, packed with pedestrians, and in 
its markets, abounding in livestock. [Long before my visit] we had already regularly been 
talking about this city, about its long reach in human history, and about the wide impact of its 
whereabouts. Many various things had been said about it by those whom we met among our 
masters and friends and who [had visited it] as pilgrims and as merchants. [Once] I asked our 
friend, the communal judge in Fez and the chief scholar in the Maghreb Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-
Maqarrī [about it], saying: ‘What is this Cairo like?’; he said: ‘One who has not seen it cannot 
know the splendour of Islam’. I asked the same question to our master Abū l-ʿAbbās b. Idrīs, 
chief scholar in Béjaïa; he said: ‘It is as though its population has done away with counting’, 
pointing at the multitude of its nations and the fact that they feel secure from the 
consequences. Our friend, the army judge in Fez, the jurisprudent and the scribe Abū l-Qāsim 
al-Burjī appeared in the public session of the sultan Abū ʿInān, upon his return from an 
embassy on [the sultan’s] behalf to the rulers of Egypt, to see that his prophetic letter got to 
the noble tomb [in Medina], in the year [7]56 (1356). Being asked about Cairo, he said: ‘For 
the sake of shortness, I will only say about it that any man who tries to imagine it, will 
experience it unlike the picture that he had imagined, as a result of the fact that a very wide 
range of things that are perceptible to the senses may be imagined, but not Cairo, which really 
transcends anything that may be imagined about it.’ The sultan and those present were highly 
impressed by that.34 
 
 2.2 From one dawla to another dawla: narratives of discontinuity and agency 
From this “seat of royalty” defying imaginations East and West the Dawlat al-Atrāk emanated 
as an equally transcendent way of thinking, seeing, performing and experiencing the universal and 
timeless political order of the Sultanate of Cairo, and of generating welcome appearances of 
structure, social order and legitimate continuity in unwieldy narratives as well as in the complex 
socio-cultural realities which these narratives claim to represent. But in contemporary texts the 
concept of dawla was also used in different, far less continuous contexts of political order. A 
cursory identification of many dozens of contemporary epigraphic and historiographical cases in 
which the noun dawla was very differently used, without being discursively tagged by the qualifier 
al-Atrāk and its variants, suggests that it was in most of these cases simply —and almost always 
without any further explanation— used in combination with a sultan’s name for the sake of 
periodisation, for explaining that something happened when sultan X or Y was in power.35 This 
                                               
34 Ibn Khaldūn, Riḥlat Ibn Khaldūn, 285-6. 
35 We retrieved 191 historiographical reports containing the noun dawla in our MP3-database (consisting of a range of 
full textual material from the major historiographical texts for the period 1382-1467; see 
http://www.mamluk.ugent.be/prosopography). Next to that textual corpus we also consulted the Thesaurus 
d’Epigraphie Islamique, which provided us with a handful of further references. 
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temporality, clearly related to the basic semantics of dawla,36 is illustrated in the inscription band on 
the western façade of al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s madrasa in Cairo, acclaiming “By God, may the dawla of 
our lord the sultan al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ last long”37; this meaning of temporal particularity also speaks 
from a commemorative inscription recording another monument’s construction in the course of 
1496 “in the dawla of […] sultan Qāytbāy”.38 From this temporal perspective, there were thus as 
many dawlas as there were sultans, ascribing to the word a meaning of endless micro-historical 
discontinuity —some sixty different dawlas of some sixty sultans reigning for some sixty periods of 
varying duration between the thirteenth and the early sixteenth centuries— that appears as the exact 
opposite of the discursive meanings that the notion of Dawlat al-Atrāk represented.  
In the relatively long list of this discontinuous type of dawla-references there may also be 
found a few atypical notes, especially in Ibn Taghrī Birdī’s dynastic chronicles, that offer some 
insight into the very different intended meanings of these references. When describing the 
usurpation of the sultanate by the amir Ṭaṭar in 1421, Ibn Taghrī Birdī suggests that this particular 
change of a ruler and his dawla involved a more substantial transformation indeed, when he 
claimed that in his view Ṭaṭar’s heroic achievement concerned the fact that “he quickly and easily 
transformed one dawla into another dawla (wa-aqlaba dawlatan bi-dawlatin ghayrihā fī aysari 
muddatin wa-ahwani ṭarīqatin)”.39 What this dawla then actually consisted of, if not merely the 
sultan or his term in office, is partly suggested elsewhere, when the same historian explained how 
the junior mamlūks of Ṭaṭar’s predecessor were re-integrated into this transformation, by  
“bringing them closer, drawing them near, and calming their fears, until each of them attached 
himself to someone from the courtiers of Ṭaṭar (ḥawāshī Ṭaṭar), as is the custom with 
unfortunate armies whose dawla has come to an end and whose power has gone (kamā hiya 
ʿādat al-ʿasākir al-maflūla mimman zālat dawlatuhum wa-dhahabat shawkatuhum).”40 
 
This specific understanding of the connection between particular social groups and a 
particular dawla is even more clearly explained in another work of history by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, 
when the author tries to elucidate how unexpected the quick deposition of the afore-mentioned 
sultan al-Muʾayyad Aḥmad b. Īnāl (r. 1461) was: 
Al-Muʾayyad’s dawla came to an end most quickly, as if it had never been. […] This 
happened in spite of the large number of his courtiers (ḥawāshīhi), the vastness of his 
possessions (amwālihi), and the impact of his charisma (ʿuẓmatihi fi l-nufūs). This was very 
                                               
36 See Rosenthal, “Dawla”. This temporal meaning is also implied in the title of al-Maqrīzī’s grand history of Egypt and 
its wider world from the time of Saladin until his own days, the Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk (“The Path 
to Knowledge of the Dawlas of the Rulers.”), and also in the title of Ibn Ṣaṣrā’s history dedicated to sultan al-Ẓāhir 
Barqūq (r. 1382-99), al-Durra al-Muḍīʾa fi l-Dawla al-Ẓāhiriyya (“The Pearl Shining over the dawla of al-Ẓāhir 
[Barqūq]”). 
37 See Kalus, Thesaurus d’Epigraphie Islamique, fiche n° 2678; Répertoire Chronologique d’Epigraphie Arabe, 11: n° 
4220. 
38 See Kalus, Thesaurus d’Epigraphie Islamique, fiche n° 12180; Van Berchem, Matériaux, p. 547, n° 364); the 
inscription texts adds with eloquent detail how Qāytbāy’s armies had gained victory over the mamlakat al-Rūm, the 
Ottomans. 
39 Ibn Taghrī Birdi, Nujūm, 6:517. 
40 Ibn Taghrī Birdi, Nujūm, 6:507. 
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different from [the qualities displayed by] the other sons of rulers who had become sultan. 
These [benefits] were mainly due to [the following factors:] his advanced age, as he was in 
his thirties when he became sultan; the fact that he had already been awarded power (li-
taḥakkumihi) during that long period of his father’s days [of ascendancy], enjoying much 
respect (ḥurma zāʾida), charismatic appeal (muhāba fi l-nufūs), and authority (kalima 
nāfidha) so that the people kept knocking at his door in order to have their matters settled; the 
fact that he had been atābak in the days of his father, for all sons of rulers that were deposed 
[from the sultanate] were time and again overcome by [the one who occupied] the position of 
atābak, and this [man’s] father had not had any other atābak than his son; the fact that the 
people were acquainted with him, in the cities and towns and in the countryside (maʿrifat al-
nās lahu bi-l-aqṭār wa-l-bilād wa-l-aryāf), [on the one hand] because he had traveled as amīr 
ḥājj maḥmal […] and on many a trip to the pasture and elsewhere, [and on the other hand 
because] he was well-informed about the Syrian domains and its conditions, from the days 
that his father had held office in those lands; [his beneficial position was also due] to the fact 
that he had many partners, courtiers and mamlūks (li-kathrat khujdāshiyyatihi wa-ḥawāshīhi 
wa-mamālīkihi) —but perhaps this trait of his was shared by the sons of the former rulers as 
well.41 
 
Not only is this type of particular dawla in the eyes of Ibn Taghrī Birdī the result of 
transformative change from one sultan to another; the term is also meant to represent a very 
dynamic relational construction of “partners, courtiers and mamlūks” and their resources, created 
around a “charismatic” centre of power, and tied to that centre’s peripheries “in the cities and towns 
and in the countryside”.42 Dawla in this context refers to a social construction, which was built 
around a relational core of individual agents that preceded its own historical appearance as a dawla 
(as in this case of Aḥmad, who is credited with the construction of his own effective base of power 
during the reign of his father, sultan al-Ashraf Inal [r. 1453-61]), and which mainly acquired that 
dawla-appearance by integrating, “drawing near” and “attaching” different people in Cairo, Syria 
and beyond and by inspiring them to accept the political authority and legitimacy that this particular 
relational construction claimed to possess.43 The widespread temporal meaning of the particular 
type of dawla appears thus as the residual of more complex, social meanings, with the succession of 
                                               
41 Ibn Taghrī Birdi, Ḥawādith, 396-7. 
42 In one unique case (at least in so far as cases have until now been identified in his vast historiographical corpus) the 
historian al-Maqrīzī (d. 1442) identifies in similar but less explicit terms this particular social dimension of dawla; in a 
story constructed around the deposition of sultan al-ʿAzīz Yūsuf b. Barsbāy (r. 1438), al-Maqrīzī connects the fall of 
Yūsuf’s dawla  (“This is the beginning of the end of the dawla of al-’Azīz”) to the fate of his and his father’s royal 
household (bayt), in a dramatic exclamation of remorse ascribed to the later sultan Īnāl, here portrayed as acting as an 
opponent of Yūsuf and as a former mamlūk of his father: “How can it be a recompense from me to al-Malik al-Ashraf 
[Barsbāy] that he bought me, raised me, taught me the Quran, and bestowed benefits upon me, and that I personally 
bring about the destruction of his household (akhraba baytahu bi-yadī)?” (Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 4: 1077) 
43 This socially constructed nature of a dawla reminds also of Ibn Khaldūn’s conceptualisation of political power as 
socially produced, as summarised in the title of the first section in the third chapter of the introduction to his work of 
history, his Muqaddima: “Royal authority (al-mulk) and large-scale dynastic power (al-dawla al-ʿāmma) are attained 
only through a group (al-qabīl) and group feeling (al-ʿaṣabiyya).” (Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, 123; idem, 
Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, 193). 
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various dawlas in historiographical narratives being thought of as the outcome of processes of 
discontinuous social reproduction and of substantial social transformations in regionally dominant 
relational power constellations, emerging around individual agencies and temporarily managing to 
claim their local appearance as a dawla. 
Of course, Ibn Taghrī Birdī’s opinions and explanations of his time’s processes of regular 
political transformation cannot claim any representative status for how any of his contemporaries, 
predecessors or successors thought about them, nor for how these processes actually evolved. These 
references do no more than express particular claims to a particular social and historical truth, about 
al-Muʾayyad Aḥmad or about any other moment of social transformation. As partners in 
communicative acts these historiographical claims are nevertheless again discursively embedded in 
more widely shared sets of forms and their meanings about the order of things. In this envisioning 
and representing of the near and fluid world of everyday political life through the notion of dawla, 
these claims were obviously at the same time also semantically related to the afore-mentioned 
statements about the structural universalities of the Dawlat al-Atrāk. In the discursive-semiotic 
context of the construction of social order about the near as well as the wider world, the concept of 
dawla appears as one of those widely used, appreciated and understood contemporary signifiers to 
explain, organise and control not just claims to regional authority and social memories of legitimate 
hierarchy and order, but also time, history and particular relations of power. 44  The powerful 
contemporary semantics of dawla and their discursive uses and users obviously, and whatever their 
precise intentions, thus all met on this continuum of political meanings of social power, legitimate 
sovereignty, and orderly authority. For Ibn Taghrī Birdī as well as for most of his contemporaries 
these discursive meanings ranged more precisely between the social memory of a universal political 
order embodied in the structural forms of the Sultanate of Cairo on the one hand, and the short-lived 
                                               
44 Loiseau brings up another passage by Ibn Khaldūn, from his autobiography, that details in unequivocal terms the 
reality of his understanding of the notion of dawla along lines of particular relations of power when explaining the rise 
of the dawla of his patron, sultan al-Ẓāhir Barqūq, in 1382: “Ayant abandonné leur rudesse pour une vie d’aisance et de 
bien-êtres, les hommes de la dawla ont perdu du même coup beaucoup de leur esprit guerrier. C’est alors que l’un de 
leurs chefs, soucieux de réparer le mal, cherchera à s’emparer du pouvoir, en s’appuyant sur ce qui lui reste de rudesse 
et en invitant les autres à renoncer à l’opulence. Pour arriver à ses fins, il en appelle à la solidarité de son clan ou de 
ceux qu’il rallie dans ce but. Après avoir pris en main la dawla, il travaille à la guérir de ses maux; il acquiert ainsi plus 
de droits que d’autres au trône et s’en trouve le plus proche. De la sorte, le trône lui revient et est gardé dans sa famille. 
C’est alors comme s’il fondait une nouvelle dawla, qui passera par les mêmes étapes, connaîtra les mêmes vicissitudes, 
avant qu’un nouveau venu s’empara du pouvoir, jusqu’au jour où la dawla entière s’éteindra ainsi que le pouvoir de 
tous ceux qui l’avaient fondée. Une autre dawla sera alors établie, dont l’esprit de corps sera fondé sur des liens de sang 
ou de clientèle complètement différents.” (Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, 125-6; from Cheddadi’s translation of Ibn 
Khaldūn’s Taʿrīf: Cheddadi, Le livre des exemples, 199-200. Despite this evocation of regular substantial social 
transformations Loiseau explains that for Ibn Khaldūn the emergence of the dawla of Barqūq and his sons only gave the 
impression of being a new dawla, whereas in fact it represented only a brief moment of resuscitation in the history of 
the same old dawla (“cet ultime sursaut ne constituait pas aux yeux d’Ibn Khaldun la fondation d’un nouvel état: ‘c’est 
comme [sic] il s’agissait d’une nouvelle dawla’ [wa-taṣīru ka-annahā dawlatun ukhrā], ‘comme la mèche d’une lampe 
qui, avant de s’éteindre, donne une flamme qui fait croire qu’elle va se rallumer’.” [Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, 126, 
322]). It may be suggested then that this attempt to imagine Barquq’s dawla as part of a continuous political project, 
despite all its changes and despite its being “fondé sur des liens de sang ou de clientèle complètement différents”, is a 
very useful illustration of the semantic uses of dawla, of the necessary and ongoing strategy to align socially newly 
produced dawlas such as Barqūq’s in the mental structures and categories of perception and thought with the structuring 
and legitimating transcendent political order of the Sultanate of Cairo, and of the priority awarded to the Dawlat al-
Atrāk as a historical actor in modern historiograhical discourse (see below). 
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effect of a particular set of patrimonial relations and of their individual agencies on the other. For 
all this appeared as a self-evident complexity of various forms of dawla, which were as distinct and 
yet interlocking as the vexed age-old concepts of social structure and agency. 
 
 
3. Toward an alternative approach: social practice, disciplinary power, and the state as a structural 
effect 
 
In the worlds of Ibn Taghrī Birdī, his colleagues and their court audiences dawla occupied a 
semantic field of power relations that stretched between a universal (as in the Dawlat al-Atrāk) and 
a particular (as in al-Muʾayyad’s dawla) set of claims to political sovereignty, social order and elite 
identity. The relationship between these two appearances of dawla, however, and especially their 
mutual causalities, remain an issue of analytical confusion. Contemporary historiographical 
discourse of political order, such as represented by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, seems to suggest a priority for 
the latter, when the temporality of a sultan’s socially constructed dawla is stressed, lamented or 
used for organising time and for explaining socio-political change. Modern historiographical 
discourse on the contrary tends to stress the priority of the former, the basic layout of that ancient 
Mamluk house of State and its structural forms persisting in its understandings as some more or less 
abstract continuous patrimonial structure within which historical action and order are to be 
explained. 45  A substantial analytical discrepancy thus divides these two discourses, and this 
opposition remains largely unacknowledged even despite the overwhelming dependency of the 
latter on the representations of the former. As suggested above, however, at the same time there 
should be no doubt about the, at least discursive, historical reality in the production and 
reproduction of late medieval Syro-Egyptian political order by both particular social agencies and 
universalising structural forms. It appears as very relevant therefore to try and escape from both 
discourses, to search for another analytical model for imagining the historical relationship between 
these two appearances of dawla in the reality of things, and to prioritise an understanding of the 
nature of these appearances’ interlocking connectivity rather than to work from an exclusive a 
priori of either a particular dawla’s agency or the Dawlat al-Atrāk’s structure.46 
                                               
45 This assumption of the Dawla al-Atrāk’s prime historical causality certainly informed the detailed reconstructions of 
these structural forms from an impressive range of various kinds of historiographical materials in the pioneering works 
of David Ayalon (Ayalon, “Studies”) and of William Popper (Popper, Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans). 
See also the preceding footnote on the confusion generated by Ibn Khaldūn’s movement up and down dawla’s semantic 
continuum. 
46 In (late) medieval European history similar confusions and related discussions of the relation between state structures 
and other historical agencies have been resolved by some scholars by simply getting rid of the category of ‘state’ (see 
Davies, “The Medieval State: the Tyranny of a Concept?”; Watt, The Making of Polities). John Watt explains in an 
inspiring passage that “it is not necessary to frame —one might almost say burden— the structural history of politics 
with the notion of the state. […] there were many political forms, practices and processes besides those that fostered the 
state or are commonly associated in historians’ minds with its operations. Nor were structures of authority, or of power, 
or even of government, necessarily or consistently co-ordinated in the way that a term like ‘state’ implies. Even if states 
emerged during the period, as some historians would wish to argue, it is not clear that that process is a helpful centre for 
a political history; indeed, organising an account that way may make the task of explaining the emergence of states 
harder, rather than easier. A more open-ended perspective on the changing political structures of the period is more 
likely to deliver not only a new and plausible narrative, but also a better explanation of the period’s developments.” (p. 
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The latter analytical perspective actually tallies very well with the prioritisation of social 
practice that, following Pierre Bourdieu’s social theories, was advocated by the afore-mentioned 
Michael Chamberlain in his Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus. 47  For 
Chamberlain, the historical interaction of (objective) structure and (subjective) agency can best be 
understood through the study of social practices, which were imagined by him as world-making 
strategies “by which people seek to understand the world and shape their futures in it”. 48  In 
particular, Chamberlain claimed the priority of household strategies of social reproduction, that is, 
of “practices […] by which lineages invest time, labor, and experience to acquire the symbolic and 
social ‘capital’ that becomes expendable currency in the struggle for household survival”. 49 
Following from this prioritisation of practices of social reproduction, for Chamberlain “rule by 
warrior households and competition among them […] defined the political arena”.50 Chamberlain’s 
overall model of analysis is that of a particular political arena —spatially circumscribed by the city 
of Damascus in a [very] long thirteenth century— “of continuously renegotiated relationships 
among the ruling household, the important amīrs and their households, and civilian elites with 
specialized knowledge or religious prestige”.51 Chamberlain thus suggests that understandings of 
social and political order should begin with studying practices of social reproduction, including 
practices of continuous negotiation among rulers, amīrs and non-military leaders for their places in 
that order. However, as explained above, in this model any form of state at best only represents “an 
abstraction of the personal ties of alliance, dependence, and dominance among these three groups”, 
so that the full weight of historical explanation remains with the particular, relational dawla of 
contemporary historiographical discourse, and the complex realities of the dawla’s structural forms 
disappear under the rubric of “abstraction”.52 Even though this may well be relevant for thirteenth-
century Damascus, making similar abstraction of the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Sultanate of 
Cairo appears as more problematic, even if only, as discussed above, from the perspective of 
contemporary historiographical discourses of political and social order. 
Operating in a very different but analytically immensely relevant context, Middle East 
historian Timothy Mitchell presents another strong case for the prioritisation of social practice in 
understanding constructions of political order.53 Unlike Chamberlain, however, Mitchell combines 
this prioritisation with an acknowledgement of the historical reality of structural forms akin to those 
                                                                                                                                                            
35) (For the analytical problems that such an “open-ended” approach may entail, see the discussion of Tim Mitchell’s 
work below). In Ottoman history Karen Barkey arguably engaged with a similar problem in a similar way in her Empire 
of Difference (even though she did continue to try and award some role to the structural forms of the Ottoman state in 
her analyses). Identifying the state as “an organization that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force over a given territory”, Barkey explained that she was “much more interested in understanding how this 
organization and its legitimacy is initially constructed by actors taking steps to convince different populations, soldiers, 
and elites to mobilize and join their efforts” (Barkey, Empire of Difference, 32). 
47 On the relationship between Chamberlain’s thought and Bourdieu’s social theory, see especially Clifford, “Ubi 
Sumus?”, esp. 57-61. 
48 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, 22. 
49 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, 22. 
50 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, 47. 
51 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, 60. 
52 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, 60. 
53 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”. 
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of the Dawlat al-Atrāk. He actually proposes “an alternative approach” to “the state” in a manner 
that tries to avoid certain analytical problems, which Mitchell sees as inherent in structuralism and 
in its prioritisation of those forms in socially transcendent ways,54 and that at the same time can 
accommodate the complex social reality of contemporary discourse and action. “This approach can 
account for the salience of the state phenomenon”, Mitchell explains in a passage that looks at post-
1945 American political sciences but fits our present analytical predicament surprisingly well, “but 
[it] avoids attributing to it the coherence, unity, and absolute autonomy that result from existing 
theoretical approaches.” 55  Mitchell’s approach agrees with Chamberlain’s in its analytical 
prioritisation of practices of social production and reproduction, and of the circulation of power 
among multiple actors. Mitchell even formulates echoes of Chamberlain’s idea of the state as a 
mere abstraction of particular power relations: 
“Conceived in this way, the state is no longer to be taken as essentially an actor, with the 
coherence, agency, and subjectivity this term presumes. We should not ask ‘Who is the state?’ 
or ‘Who dictates its policies?’ Such questions presume what their answers pretend to prove: that 
some political subject, some who [sic], pre-exists and determines those multiple arrangements 
that we call the state. The arrangements that produce the apparent separateness of the state 
create the abstract effect of agency, with concrete consequences. [italics mine] Yet such agency 
will always be contingent upon the production of difference —upon those practices that create 
the apparent boundary between state and society [italics mine]. These arrangements may be so 
effective, however, as to make things appear the reverse of this. The state comes to seem a 
subjective starting point, as an actor that intervenes in society. Statist approaches to political 
analysis take this reversal for reality. (pp. 90-1)56 
 
As is clear from this passage, Mitchell’s “abstract effect of the state’s agency” repeats 
Chamberlain’s “abstraction”, but Mitchell, expanding from Michel Foucault’s epistemological 
theories, does so in ways that continue to situate the state phenomenon within the historical action 
of social practice and of the related “production of difference”, rather than somewhere outside of 
any such practice. To this purpose Mitchell stresses first the internal nature of power, emerging 
“from within, not at the level of an entire society, but at the level of detail, and not by constraining 
individuals and their actions, but by producing them”.57 Secondly, Mitchell also stresses that this 
productive and internal nature of power tends to manifest itself through particular methods for the 
organisation and articulation “of space, movement, sequence and position”, and more generally 
through “detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, 
and supervision and surveillance”. These methods for the creation of some form of order reveal 
how power is at the same time internal and productive, and “localized” and “disciplinary” in 
                                               
54 For Mitchell, “Structuralism takes for granted the idea of structure —an actual framework that somehow stands apart 
from physical reality as its dimension of order— and does not ask how this apparently metaphysical separation is 
brought about” (Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, 94). 
55 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, 78. 
56 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”,90-91. 
57 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, 93. 
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nature.58 Thirdly, for Mitchell the manifestation of this disciplinary type of power also involves a 
process of externalising explanations for internally produced power relations, “which create the 
appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society.”59 Disciplinary power shapes 
order through the organisation, the articulation and hence the production of social difference, so that 
“at the same time as power relations become internal in this way, and by the same methods, they 
now appear to take the novel form of external structures”.60 Mitchell therefore understands the 
social practices of disciplinary power as also capable of producing a set of incoherent but powerful 
and above all meaningful structural effects that tend to be identified as pertaining to the normative 
order of the state and its agents, institutions, sites, value systems, resources and narratives. “The 
state”, Mitchell concludes, “needs to be analyzed as such a structural effect. That is to say, it should 
be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that 
make such structures appear to exist.”61 Only thus, according to Mitchell, the complex relationship 
between the phenomenon of the state, social difference, and the practices that produce both can be 
properly accounted for. 
For Mitchell disciplinary power and its structural effects of the state are particular, even 
exclusive, to the modern world. 62  The preceding discussions of modern and late medieval 
discourses of power have shown, however, how much the appearance of political order was an issue 
of high social and symbolic value in the worlds of late medieval Syria and Egypt too, when late 
medieval Syro-Egyptian authors and actors alike attempted to apply their own methods of order and 
to discipline their variegated subjects under rubrics such as that of dawla. Mitchell’s 
conceptualisation appears therefore as underestimating pre-modern appearances of the state (or, 
perhaps, as overestimating the disciplinary shift of modernity). In pre-modern contexts, such as that 
of late medieval Syria and Egypt, disciplinary power as generated in social practice through 
“microphysical methods of order” was obviously very different and displayed less infrastructural 
complexity than in the modern world. But it surely had similar effects of the localised production of 
difference and of the appearance of a structurally external agency of a dawla. In the search for an 
alternative model that allows for thinking particular social agencies and universalising structural 
forms together, Mitchell’s correlation of social practice, disciplinary power and the state as a set of 
structural effects therefore shows a valid and valuable way forward for the integration of late 
                                               
58 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, 92-93, 95. The concept of disciplinary power refers to “those […] microphysical 
methods of order that Foucault calls disciplines” (p. 92, referring to M. Foucault, Discipline and punish: the birth of the 
prison [New York, 1977]). 
59 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, 95. 
60 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, 93-94. 
61 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, 94. 
62 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, 94; this follows from the reliance on Foucault’s identification of disciplines as 
strictly “modern metaphysical methods of order”, as further explained by Mitchell in the following passage: “None of 
these new methods appeared overnight. The French military reforms of 1791, for example, were developed from earlier 
reforms in Prussia, which had their own antecedents elsewhere in Europe. Nor were they confined to the army. As 
Foucault has shown, similar methods of enclosing and partitioning space, systematizing surveillance and inspection, 
breaking down complex tasks into carefully drilled movements, and coordinating separate functions into larger 
combinations were developed around the same period in factories, schools, prisons, hospitals, commercial 
establishments, and government offices. The spread of such methods from field to field in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries represented a new, localized, yet enormously productive technology of power.” (p. 92) 
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medieval and modern discourses of power as well as Chamberlain’s pivotal thinking into one 
alternative model. 
 
 
4. An alternative approach 
 4.1 Reproduction, segmentation and integration, and their structural effects 
Up to this point, this reflexive essay has argued that there exists a remarkable discrepancy 
between modern Mamluk and contemporary dawla discourses of political power and authority, 
which may be summarised as structure-driven and as agency-driven respectively. This essay has 
also argued that an appealing alternative approach to step outside of these discourses’ mutually 
exclusive explanatory frameworks, without ignoring their analytical value, may be found in 
Chamberlain’s prioritisation of social practices of household reproduction, and in Mitchell’s related 
understanding of the state as a structural effect of practices of social differentiation, more in 
particular as an appearance of political order and social difference produced in social practice by 
various sets of disciplinary arrangements. Given the relative success of Chamberlain’s notion of the 
social practice of reproduction —patronage, competition, kinship, household formation, 
factionalism, circulation of people and ideas, knowledge, education and wider practices of 
socialisation,…— in the expansion and specialisation of modern late medieval Syro-Egyptian 
historiography, it is furthermore not necessarily social reproduction that requires much more 
elaboration as an analytical category for historical research.63 Social differentiation, however, has so 
far largely remained unexplored as an analytical category of social practice, in its capacity both of 
the production of apparent boundaries between groups —segmentation— and of the creation of 
coherent groups —integration.64 The wide range of structural effects of these interlocking practices 
of social reproduction, integration and segmentation, and the impact of those effects on “the mental 
structures and categories of perception and thought” and from them in reciprocal fashion on the 
                                               
63 Representative recent examples of this relative growth of (explicit or implicit) analytical engagements with the wide 
variety of late-medieval Syro-Egyptian practices of social reproduction include various contributions to Everything is 
on the Move; Eychenne, Liens personnels; Hirschler, Medieval Arabic Historiography; Fancy, Science and Religion in 
Mamluk Egypt; Stilt, Islamic Law in Action; Christ, Trading Conflicts. 
64 On the politics of difference and of negotiating social boundaries and on the analytical relevance of studying practices 
of segmentation and integration for understanding the historical dynamics of political power and authority, see Barkey, 
Empire of Difference, esp. 17-22. The notion of social differentiation has off-course played its part in late medieval 
Syro-Egyptian social history, but then as a descriptive category rather than as a social practice (see e.g. Lapidus, Muslim 
Cities; Petry, Civilian Elites of Cairo). Three extremely relevant exceptions to this generalising observation are 
Berkey’s study of the negotiations of religious authority and social hierarchy in the field of (popular) preaching in late 
medieval Egypt (Berkey, Popular Preaching and Religious Authority), Loiseau’s discussion of fifteenth-century 
Circassian ethnicity as part of the construction of new political identities and of the negotiation of new elite social 
boundaries (Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, 173-200), and —even though slightly earlier in temporal focus yet highly 
relevant from an analytical perspective— Ackerman-Lieberman’s challenge to standard scholarship on Jewish socio-
economic participation and identity formation in Egypt and the wider Mediterranean by focussing on distinctive trading 
procedures as strategies of social differentiation and of the negotiation of Jewish communal identity (Ackerman-
Lieberman, The Business of Identity); it is finally also relevant to refer here to Richardson’s discussion of the cultural 
construction of physical difference and disability in her Difference and Disability. 
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transient disciplinary arrangements of that social practice have, by and large, so far remained 
unnoticed.65  
These structural and structuring effects are as wide-ranging indeed as late-medieval Syro-
Egyptian social action was, spanning the modern categories of society, culture, economy and 
politics and the full spectrum of contemporary processes of organising the near and wider world, of 
making it a meaningful space and place, and of shaping one’s future in it. Only one set of these 
multiple, varied, and overlapping effects will be explored here further, related to the appearances of 
a political order in late medieval Egypt and Syria that has been identified variously as the Mamluk 
State, the Dawlat al-Atrāk, a sultan’s dawla, and the Sultanate of Cairo. In this final analysis, it will 
not just be argued that these appearances of forms of state were related in complex ways to a 
particular set of social practices and methods of order. It will also be argued that in this context 
disciplinary arrangements of political integration and segmentation were repeatedly obstructed by 
another, competing set of methods of social reproduction. Both originated in social practice and 
closely interacted, but both also moved at different speeds and engaged with different ideas of order 
and with different structural effects, giving shape to a particular dynamic of political continuity and 
discontinuity in late medieval Syro-Egyptian history that tends to be underrated. 
From the perspective of an internalised, localised and disciplinary understanding of power as 
social practice, late medieval Syro-Egyptian political history emerges first and foremost from 
particular sets of patrimonial relations and reproductive patterns around local leaders. 66  As 
Chamberlain suggested, in thirteenth-century Damascus this created a highly segmented and 
multipolar political environment, with rulers, amirs and cultural elite groups competing for the 
distribution of local political, social, economic and cultural resources and producing the effect of a 
fragile and temporal local political equilibrium at best. Moving to mid-fifteenth-century Cairo and 
the case of al-Muʾayyad Aḥmad b. ʾĪnāl’s short-lived dawla as remembered by Ibn Taghrī Birdī, a 
similar appearance of locality, multipolarity and fragility remains. Even though the young sultan 
and his entourage appeared as endowed in great pomp with all the structural forms of the Dawlat al-
Atrāk, any structural effects of universalising authority surely remained as limited in space and 
place as they turned out to be in time. In fact, many local political realities co-existed with that of 
this sultan and his court in the Citadel of Cairo, as had been the case in thirteenth-century 
                                               
65 This reciprocate interaction between structures and agents, both constituted in social practice in mutually productive 
and reproductive fashions, is a core insight of Structuration Theory (Giddens, The Constitution of Society, eg. p. 28 
[“Actors draw upon the modalities of structuration in the reproduction of systems of interaction, by the same token 
reconstituting their structural properties.”]). This also reminds of Bourdieu’s integration of the notions of (objective) 
structure and (subjective) agency into one model of social practice, through his development of the practical tools of 
habitus and field; in the specific context of state formation, this reflexive interaction was reformulated by Bourdieu as 
follows: “[The state] incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and 
mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought. By realizing 
itself in social structures and in the mental structures adapted to them, the instituted institution makes us forget that it 
issues out of a long series of acts of institution (in the active sense) and hence has all the appearance of the natural.” 
(Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State”, 3-4). 
66 Some of these particular sets of patrimonial relations and patterns of reproduction have been surveyed, analysed 
and/or applied to understandings of their particular historical manifestations in Sievert, “Family, friend or foe?” (with 
further references to many other relevant publications, especially from German and anglophone scholarship); Eychenne, 
Liens personnels (with further references, especially also from French scholarship); Van Steenbergen, “The Mamluk 
Sultanate as a Military Patronage State”. 
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Damascus, escaping from the limited reach of his radar, existing in their own parallel political 
realities, or even promoting similar but alternative political orders. In the latter competition, the 
structural forms of the Sultanate of Cairo surely provided a leader such as al-Muʾayyad Aḥmad with 
advantageous and distinctive tools to deploy physical and symbolic violence. But these forms 
simultaneously also channelled and limited his options, and heightened his and his entourage’s 
stakes. When the claim to political order disagreed with the social orders of things, political 
authority remained challenged and its reproduction in local relationships remained a vexed issue. In 
historical contexts such as these, paraphrasing Ibn Taghrī Birdī, “one dawla can quickly and easily 
transform into another dawla” —they may even co-exist in competing ways—, and the structural 
effects of state and sultanate tend to appear in very vague, fickle, and, yes, even abstract terms 
indeed. 
As suggested above, however, these structural effects did not always present themselves in 
such abstract terms. At times, they appeared so forcefully that those who performed, produced or 
reproduced them could and did meaningfully project them on an impressive canvas of the 
sultanate’s wider world. Throughout the long history of the Sultanate of Cairo there actually 
occurred particular moments of rule at which the appearances of the Dawlat al-Atrāk and its 
structural forms truly seem to have managed to transcend this level of abstraction.67 This was the 
case towards the ends of the reigns of al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybars (1260-77) and of al-Malik al-
Manṣūr Qalāwūn (1279-90), often credited as a result with establishing the traditional, normative 
appearances of those structural forms.68 This was certainly also the case during the thirty-years 
reign of al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (r. 1310-1341) and to a large extent also during 
its continuance under some of his Qalāwūnid descendants (r. 1341-82), when many structural forms 
—from the amirate of the Syrian bedouin over the cadastral organisation of Syria and Egypt to the 
dynastic, Qalāwūnid appearance of the sultanate itself— were newly introduced or provided with a 
                                               
67 For practical reasons we will not include in this essay any reflection on the structural contributions of Ayyūbid rulers 
such as Saladin, al-Malik al-ʿĀdil and al-Malik al-Kāmil, and al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb, even though there are good 
reasons to consider (and to appreciate contemporaries’ considerations of) their reigns between the later twelfth and mid-
thirteenth century as integral to the history of the Sultanate of Cairo, if only because not just its social practices (see 
Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice), but also many of its structural forms, including the sultanate and the 
citadel of Cairo, originated or were fundamentally redefined in the course of their reigns (the best analytical survey of 
Ayyūbid politics remains to date Humphreys, From Saladin to the Mongols; for the most recent general survey 
approach, see Eddé, “Ayyūbids”). This question of thirteenth-century continuities, of course, goes back to an old debate 
between David Ayalon and Stephen Humphreys, summarised by the latter a decade ago as follows: “Ayalon [in “From 
Ayyūbids to Mamlūks”] insists on the fundamental identity of the Ayyubid and Mamluk political and military systems. 
As always, his arguments are enlightening and richly documented; in spite of his criticisms, however, I still adhere to 
the main conclusions in my “The Emergence of the Mamluk Army,” Studia Islamica 45 (1977): 67-99 and 46 (1977): 
147-82, [that they were fundamentally different on the deeper level of the often unspoken values, attitudes, and 
assumptions which shaped political conduct]”; in many ways, the key issue around which this debate revolved may 
again be re-imagined as one of prioritising either the structures of the Dawlat al-Atrāk (Ayalon) or rather the practices 
that coalesced around the varying agencies of particular dawlas (Humphreys). On contemporary historiographers’ 
engagement (or rather non-engagement) with the so-called Ayyūbid-Mamlūk transition in the mid-thirteenth century, 
see Lev, “The Transition from the Ayyūbids to the Mamlūks”). 
68  Thorau, The Lion of Egypt; Northrup, From Slave to Sultan; Thorau, “Einige kritische Bemerkungen zum 
sogenannten ‘mamlūk phenomenon’”. 
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new outlook for decades to come.69  Another, similar, moment occurred under the charismatic 
leadership of sultan Barqūq (1382-1399), when amongst many other things court offices multiplied 
and new fiscal arrangements were set up.70 Then there were the successive reigns of sultans al-
Malik al-Ashraf Barsbāy (r. 1422-1438) and of al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq (r. 1438-1453), when the 
institutional relationships between Cairo’s court and varieties of local communities in Egypt, Syria, 
the Hijaz, Anatolia and Cyprus were radically reconfigured. 71  This was, among many other 
structural adaptations, repeated in the long-lasting days of sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf Qāytbāy (r. 
1468-1496), and then again during the creative reign of sultan Qansawh al-Ghawrī (r. 1501-1516).72 
These moments of structural adaptation and efflorescence seem to appear as coinciding with 
particularly successful moments of rule as far as military conquest, charismatic authority or 
longevity in royal office were concerned. From the perspective of patrimonial leadership practices 
that produced these particular structural effects, it may then be argued that next to that fragile, local 
and multipolar type of political authority, as that existed in Chamberlain’s thirteenth-century 
Damascus or in al-Muʾayyad Aḥmad’s fifteenth-century dawla, there also emerged at regular 
historical intervals another more coherent, trans-local and unipolar type of political authority in late 
medieval Egypt and Syria. In the case of this type of power and authority, the range of methods that 
produced and reproduced political authority, order and power had expanded and had managed to 
integrate almost all politically relevant social groups and communities from a wide variety of local 
contexts into the appearance of one structural whole of, simultaneously, a particular sultan’s dawla 
and the Dawlat al-Atrāk, as embodied in that sultan’s dawla and its particular arrangements in 
favour of that sultan’s political order. In this context, ever more diverse sets of these disciplinary 
methods of order appear to have ensured the continued practical production of an apparent social 
boundary in favour of the ruler’s, his court’s and their local partners’ order of things, and of ever 
more complex patterns of similar structural effects that appeared to converge in his hegemonic 
authority. These disciplinary methods were shaped by and continued to give shape to old and new 
                                               
69 Flinterman & Van Steenbergen, “Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and the Formation of the Qalāwūnid State”; Van Steenbergen, 
Order Out of Chaos; on the amirate of the Arabs, see Hiyari, “The Origins and Development of the Amīrate of the 
Arabs”; on the cadastral survey al-rawk al-nāṣirī, see especially Sato, “The Proposers and Supervisors of al-Rawk al-
Nāṣirī”; on Qalāwūnid dynasticism, see amongst others Van Steenbergen, “Qalāwūnid Discourse, Elite Communication 
and the Mamluk Cultural Matrix”; on other Qalāwūnid structural forms, see amongst others Flood, “Umayyad Survivals 
and Mamluk Revivals”; Eychenne, Liens personnels; idem, “Réseau, pratiques et pouvoir(s) au début du XIVe siècle”; 
and (although interpreting the emergence of these Qalāwūnid structural forms more negatively, as a breakdown of 
traditional social and cultural orders) Levanoni, A Turning Point in Mamluk History; idem, “Rank-and-File Mamluks 
versus Amirs”. 
70 Loiseau, Reconstruire la Maison du Sultan, 1350-1450, esp. 179-214, 287-330; Onimus, “Les émirs dans le sultanat 
mamelouk sous les sultans Barqūq et Farağ (1382-1412)”, esp. 166-311, 389-512.  
71 Loiseau, Reconstruire la Maison du Sultan, esp. 179-278; Meloy, “Imperial Strategy and Political Exigency”; idem, 
“Economic intervention”; idem, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade, esp. 81-170; Wing, “Indian Ocean Trade and 
Sultanic Authority”; idem, “Submission, Defiance, and the Rules of Politics on the Mamluk Sultanate’s Anatolian 
Frontier”; Adriaenssens and Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk Authorities and Anatolian Realities”; and (although rather 
outdated in its general approach still of interest in some of its detail) Darrag, L’Egypte sous le règne de Barsbay. 
72  See, amongst others, Petry, “The Military Innovations of Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī”; idem, Protectors or 
Praetorians?; idem, “The Military Institution and Innovation in the Late Mamlūk Period”; Behrens-Abouseif, 
“Qāytbāy’s Investments in the City of Cairo”; idem, “Qāytbāy’s Foundation in Medina”; idem, “Qāytbāy’s Madrasahs 
in the Holy Cities”; idem, “Sultan al-Ghawrī and the Arts”; Har-El, Struggle for Domination in the Middle East); 
Meloy, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade, esp. 171-232. 
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structural forms of the Sultanate of Cairo, as these were also reproduced in various discourses of 
power: from the symbolic bodies of sultanate and amirate, over particular geographies of power, 
mechanisms of resource management, and narratives of championship and victory, to local 
manifestations of caliphate and Sunni Islam, all creating appearances of continuous normative 
order. A token of the success of these disciplinary methods would then be the widening of the 
apparent social distance between the ruler, his court and other relevant groups to the extent that the 
agents that performed the reproduction of the ruler’s order and, hence, of his authority —in these 
agents’ diverse and particular interactions with various local political, social, economic and cultural 
groups in Egypt, Syria or beyond— acquired an appearance of political autonomy, of representing 
and reproducing a depersonalising state of trans-local dimensions in the centre and in the many 
peripheries of the sultanate. In this process, the ruler himself might eventually even disappear 
behind the curtain of his audience room, leaving only an abstract impression of the practical bonds 
that tied him to the circulation of power: he might vanish entirely from social practice, cross to the 
other side of the imagined boundaries that staked out his state from its so-called subjects, and he (or 
his descendants) might then re-appear only in the structural effects of his royal persona wherever 
the disciplinary methods of social order and political authority required him to. 
 
 4.2 Transformation, the tanistric mode of reproduction, and political order as process in 
late medieval Egypt and Syria 
In the latter unipolar moment of political organisation, as in the former multipolar one, the 
Dawlat al-Atrāk was continuously recreated by and reinvented from the disciplinary necessities of 
particular times and contexts. Whatever the complexity of its forms and whatever its necessary 
appearance as projecting an image of orderly structural continuity, the Sultanate of Cairo appeared 
always also as different and adapted to the needs of particular rulers, reigns, elite constellations and 
their practical arrangements. This explains how the structural effects of the above-mentioned 
moments of unipolar authority from Baybars to al-Ghawrī can be referred to in singular terms, and 
this also reminds of how local hierarchies are presented in contemporary historiography as requiring 
regular informational updates and as acquiring new and substantially adapted guises between the 
early fourteenth and the early sixteenth centuries. This finally also subscribes to the notion that 
rulers’ reigns were considered as sufficiently distinct in historiographical and related discourses to 
serve for the structuration and organisation of political time and space, and for explaining that 
something happened in the dawla of ruler X or Y. The state always being a product of a particular 
ruler’s political success means that it was in its very essence always discontinuous, whatever its 
continuous appearances. This political discontinuity, however, was again not structural, but 
inscribed in social practice, where disciplinary methods developing from practices of social 
reproduction and differentiation continuously had to compete with opposite social practices and 
their effects. 
Contrary to the afore-mentioned common ‘one-generation’-assumptions, it is by now widely 
acknowledged that dynastic aspirations appeared regularly as a rule of thumb in the Sultanate’s 
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reproductive practices of royal succession.73 As will be elaborated below, however, dynasticism 
was really again only one particular structural effect (as were appearances of that ‘one-generational-
ism’) of particular arrangements in social practice.74 This practice has been referred to —in perhaps 
more structuralist terms than it deserves— as tanistry, or as the recurrent phenomenon of usurpation 
and of succession to rule by the most capable male member of the ruling clan as decided by the 
sword.75 In the particular practical context of competition for power and authority in late-medieval 
Egypt and Syria, the legitimating contours of this ruling clan were open to constant negotiation and 
interpretation by different dynastic and non-dynastic stakeholders, who always tended to organise 
themselves in opposing power groups and factions when succession had to be negotiated.76 This 
tanistric mode of socio-political reproduction, this recurrent tendency of the region’s political order 
to completely fragment into various groups of claimants for legitimate leadership, is a major causal 
factor in the transformative character of power, authority and the appearances of the state in the 
Cairo Sultanate. It causes the repeated total disappearance of formerly powerful household 
constellations and their leader or leaders, the regular disruption of carefully negotiated balances 
between particular elite groups in the centre and in the peripheries of royal power, and the constant 
re-imagining of social order and its political structuration. 
The particular alternative model of late medieval Syro-Egyptian political (trans-)formation 
that can be developed from all this is not meant to represent any historical or descriptive model for 
writing the political history of the sultanate. It is not entirely new in any of its components either.77 
It is rather formulated here as an open-ended and dynamic theoretical toolkit that may be used for 
trying to appreciate and understand in different, perhaps even new ways the history of late medieval 
Syro-Egyptian political power as that was continuously emanating more or less successfully from 
the Citadel of Cairo. As an alternative way for thinking about issues of political sovereignty, 
                                               
73 Ayalon, “The Circassians in the Mamluk kingdom”; idem, “From Ayyūbids to Mamlūks”; Haarmann, “Regicide and 
the ‘Law of the Turks’”, esp. 128-30; idem, “The Mamluk System of Rule”, esp. 22-4; Van Steenbergen, “The Mamluk 
Sultanate as a Military Patronage State” (which concludes that “Qalāwūnid dynastic trends were…the public and 
symbolic representation of the wide-ranging spread of that Qalāwūnid bayt’s multifarious tentacles into Mamluk society 
at large, resulting in such a momentum that this household managed to outlive its gradual loss of political relevance and 
retained some special, royal status until 1433” [p. 212]); Fuess, “Mamluk Politics”, 99-102 (who introduces the 
chronology of a “Qalāwūnid dynastic phase (1310-1382)” and of a “Mixed dynastic and meritocratic phase (1382-
1412)”); Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, 106-12 (who concludes more in general that “de 1250 à 1517, des solutions 
politiques différentes furent ainsi trouvée à la tension constitutive du régime entre le caractère non héréditaire des 
charges et des honneurs militaires, défendu avec plus ou moins d’exclusive par les Mamelouks, et la volonté de chacun 
de s’établir et de transmettre un peu de sa position et de sa fortune à ses enfants, que certains sultans cherchèrent à 
consolider dans un véritable projet dynastique” [111-2]). 
74 This point was similarly made on the basis of very particular empirical findings, rather than —as will be done here— 
of generalising theoretical analyses, in Van Steenbergen, “Caught between heredity and merit”. 
75 Fletcher, “Turco-Mongolian monarchic tradition in the Ottoman empire”, esp. 236-42. 
76  Van Steenbergen, “Caught between heredity and merit”, 21-2; Sievert, “Family, friend or foe?”, esp. 105-17, 
referring also to Irwin, “Factions in Medieval Egypt”, and to Levanoni, “The Sultan’s Laqab”. 
77 It is pertinent to explain that this model strongly reminds of Ibn Khaldūn’s generational stages of a dawla, but then 
without wishing to posit the historical, natural, evolutionary and structurally cyclical programme that these stages are 
considered to follow in Ibn Khaldūn’s writings (cfr. Ibn Khaldūn, section fourteen of chapter three: “Dynasties have a 
natural life span like individuals (fī anna al-dawla lahā aʿmār ṭabīʿiyya kamā li-l-ashkhāṣ)” Ibn Khaldūn, The 
Muqaddimah, 136-8; Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, 213-5. It is equally pertinent to explain that this model 
was inspired by Ernest Gellner’s “Flux and Reflux in the Faith of Men”, his Khaldunian interpretation of human 
religious ‘oscillation’ between polytheism and monotheism. 
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political agency and the state it stands as a practical model of social transformation that imagines 
the political order that was emanating from Cairo’s citadel as oscillating to and from between two 
ideal types of dawla-producing socio-cultural practices and relations around patrimonial leaders, as 
in a constant state of flux on a continuum of increasingly connected and wide-ranging practices of 
social reproduction, elite integration and political segmentation that organised the circulation of 
power in particular ways and that, as disciplinary arrangements, created various sets of local and 
trans-local appearances of political order and social distinction, of the Dawlat al-Atrāk, and of the 
Sultanate of Cairo. Viewed through the prism of this model of political order as process, as 
continuously in the action of becoming between multipolar and unipolar arrangements and their 
interlocking effects, it transpires that the sultanate’s long history of political order experienced 
above all —as did any other West-Asian political formation in the later medieval period— regular 
moments that approached the multipolar type, when power constellations around patrimonial 
leaders time and again were jostling for pre-eminence. The prevalent practice of the tanistric mode 
of reproduction meant that any political order in late medieval Egypt and Syria easily tended to 
disintegrate and to have to be rebuilt from this multipolar type of socio-political organisation. The 
relatively undistinguished and sometimes extremely short-lived reigns of no less than fifty odd 
sultans in Cairo—including the reigns of Ṭaṭar in 1421, of Muʾayyad Aḥmad b. Īnāl in 1461, and 
even of the latter’s father Īnāl between 1453 and 1461— were always due to their inability, 
rashness, or simple failure to accomplish their own political orders, applying their own methods of 
integration, segmentation, and social reproduction —such as those concerning Aḥmad’s “partners, 
courtiers and mamlūks”, the “vastness of his resources” and “the impact of his charisma”— with 
limited success only, if any at all. Moments of rule that tended towards the unipolar type only 
emerged in specific contexts, of successful, relatively long and charismatic authority, as in the 
afore-mentioned diverse cases of the reigns of the sultans Baybars, Qalāwūn, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, 
Barqūq, Barsbāy, Jaqmaq, Qāytbāy and Qansawh, when more successful practical arrangements of 
integration, segmentation and reproduction enabled these rulers and their entourages to steer the 
local circulation of power in particular monopolising ways. As suggested above, however, the latter 
unipolar moments always generated such distinctive structural effects that they also affected the 
political, social, economic, and cultural arrangements of reproduction, integration and segmentation 
of subsequent moments, that they even affected the very idea of whatever local and global political 
order the Dawlat al-Atrāk was meant to represent. Certain old and new particular methods of order 
always indeed tended to prove more resilient than others, to prove capable of accommodating and at 
the same time also channelling substantial and beneficial changes in the circulation of power. 
Originating from local practices of power within the sultanate’s courtly elite circles, such successful 
methods regularly managed to stimulate their own reproductions in ever changing disciplining 
arrangements. These always contributed to the appearance of belonging to one coherent political 
order topped by the sultan, and they were always organised around related sets of highly symbolic 
sites, identities and discourses as well as around particular flows of human and economic resources. 
From the symbolic bodies of sultanate and amirate, over particular geographies of power, 
mechanisms of resource management, and narratives of universality, championship and victory, to 
the local manifestations of caliphate and Sunni Islam, all constantly re-appeared in similarly 
structuring but formally diverse ways from the practical arrangements embodied in ever changing 
power relations that emanated from the royal court in Cairo. Amid the multiplicity of voices and 
actions in which each and every one of these incoherent arrangements were continuously 
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manifested, even contemporary discourses of order emerged as one particular set of effects, 
generating structuring appearances of normative political order, of legitimate continuity and of 
statist authority throughout the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries in Egypt, Syria and beyond. 
An alternative model for understanding late medieval Syro-Egyptian political organisation 
that emerges from all this is then one of sultanic political order —the state— as process, in constant 
flux as the structural effect and structuring embodiment of constantly changing practices of social 
reproduction, elite integration and political distinction, in contexts that range between multipolar 
and unipolar social organisation at and around Cairo’s court and its military elites.78 Appearing as 
structurally united and coherent, these practices and their formal and discursive effects deserve to 
be studied in the particularity of their implementation and appearance, accepting that any view of 
them as a structural whole endowed with a particular historical agency equals participating in 
contemporary discourses of their construction as such agents first and foremost. 
In many ways, this alternative model of political organisation stands out as analytically 
liberating from the imposition of any structural a priori on any object of late medieval Syro-
Egyptian study. If the state is no longer considered an actor in the traditional sense, but rather a 
structural and structuring set of effects of particular practical methods of social reproduction, 
integration and segmentation, historical phenomena such as texts, objects, people, events, practices, 
institutions and relations no longer necessarily have to be approached through the direct or indirect 
prism of any more or less successful monopolising, hegemonic or other form of state, even when 
these phenomena participate one way or another in the production or reproduction of those 
structural and structuring effects of political order and state. In the same vein, the traditional state-
society construct that tends to act as the defining framework for all late medieval Syro-Egyptian 
research takes on entirely new meanings in this model, both state and society in fact appearing as 
structural and structuring effects of related practical methods of order, including as reproduced in 
contemporary and in modern historiographical discourses imagining Cairo’s near and wider worlds. 
Those worlds were far more segmented in incoherent practical ways than they appeared from these 
discourses, and it is in their segmentation and fragmentation that they need to be understood before 
any claims can be made about their appearances as socially and politically meaningful structural 
wholes.79 
 
                                               
78 In an adaptation of the afore-mentioned traditional Weberian definitions of the state this process of political order that 
is meant by the notion of the state, or of the dawla of contemporary usage, may then be defined for the present purposes 
as: the structural appearance of political order and of social difference that was re/produced by/for an elite social 
formation that successfully claims the hegemony of the legitimate use of (physical and symbolic) violence and of 
legitimate surplus extraction in a particular territory, through the concentration in its hands of interdependent 
mechanisms, instruments and strategies of reproduction and differentiation (see fn. 20). 
79 This perspective of many social realities existing side by side, in constantly changing and overlapping, intersecting or 
fully segmented ways, while the categories of ‘state’ and ‘society’ are first and foremost abstractions and ideational 
projections (with a potential structuring impact on those realities) made by in- and outsiders (both contemporary and 
modern), reminds in a somewhat more revisionist and less structuralist fashion of Conermann’s introductory words to 
the ASK Network Conference Proceedings, that “in this volume, we try to understand the ‘Mamluk Empire’, not as a 
confined space but as a region where several nodes of different networks existed side-by-side and at the same time. In 
our opinion, these networks constitute to a great extent the core of the so-called Mamluk society; they form the basis of 
the social order.” (Conermann, “Networks and Nodes in Mamluk Times”, 9). 
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5. Epilogue: the Cairo Sultanate between dynastic and Mamluk political orders 
 
By way of concluding observation and illustration, it is relevant to summarily evoke here one 
set of these meaningful structural appearances, as originating in, deriving from and disciplining 
more or less successfully but in fundamentally distinct ways a segmented and regularly fragmenting 
late medieval Syro-Egyptian world of social practice. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the 
process of social organisation around patrimonial leaders and their practices of reproduction, 
integration and segmentation witnessed remarkable moments of unipolar hegemonic complexity, 
especially, as mentioned above, in the long reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (1293-4, 
1299-1309, 1310-1341). In general, an equally remarkable series of successes of dynastic agents 
and ideas manifested itself in ongoing competition during and after al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s long 
reign.80 Throughout this period, therefore, these dynastic contingencies repeatedly managed to bind 
and discipline the practices of tanistric reproduction and of subsequent regular elite fragmentation 
into one more or less transcendent normative effect of the apparent reproduction of particular 
groups of agents and ideas. When the political order of most of the fourteenth century was marked 
by the reign of the descendants of the late-thirteenth-century mamlūk and sultan Qalāwūn (r. 1279-
1290), that made for a longstanding, meaningful and very real structural effect of a particular 
dynastic political order, with substantial impact “in the mental structures and categories of 
perception and thought” of the time. This normative appearance of one particular dynastic order in 
turn percolated back into the diverse methods that were deployed in the citadels, palaces, mosques, 
madrasas, markets, monuments, texts, and objects of the era to reproduce, integrate, distinguish and 
discipline various agents and agencies, giving particular, dynastic shapes and meanings to the 
symbolic bodies, political geographies, resource flows, and discourses of the Dawlat al-Atrāk every 
time they were re-enacted in social practice.81 
The appearance of political order in the fifteenth century, however, was very different, and 
this was not in the least due to a complete failure of social practices of tanistric reproduction to 
acquire similar dynastic forms of social differentiation and to be disciplined by similar structuring 
impacts of dynastic order. Between 1412 and 1468 in particular, different combinations of new and 
mainly mamlūk political elites were repeatedly reproduced as the increasingly complex web of 
agents of a relatively quick succession of no less than five sultans and their dawlas (sultans al-
Muʾayyad Shaykh [r. 1412-21], al-Ashraf Barsbāy [1422-38], al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq [1438-53], al-Ashraf 
Īnāl [1453-61] and al-Ẓāhir Khushqadam [1461-7]). In the turnover of sultans and the rapid 
disintegration of their networks of courtiers, agents and supporters in tanistric competition, 
however, also old elite groups and individuals remained deeply involved in the circulation of 
power, and many of them were often first marginalised due to a particular court’s fragmentation, 
                                               
80 See the references above, in footnotes 69 & 73, and Van Steenbergen, “Caught between heredity and merit”. 
81 This point of the dynastic normative and therefore also cultural formation of fourteenth-century political organisation 
in Egypt and Syria is illustrated in, respectively, some more particular textual and art-historical detail in: Van 
Steenbergen, “Qalāwūnid Discourse, Elite Communication, and the Mamluk Cultural Matrix”; Flinterman & Van 
Steenbergen, “Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and the Formation of the Qalāwūnid state”. 
 36 
only to be recycled later on in subsequent new political contexts.82 The increasingly advanced age 
at which the period’s sultans ascended the throne, after long but also winding political careers in 
and out of the limelight, surely is one of the better known illustrations of this process (Barsbāy was 
in his forties in 1422, Jaqmaq was in his sixties in 1438, and Īnāl was 73 in 1453).  
As argued above, this production, reproduction and recycling of elites and practices in a 
succession of changing social orders is of course not entirely different from what went on before. 
But in the first decades of the fifteenth century this process of ongoing social transformation and 
segmentation involved power elites, households and networks of predominantly mamlūk 
background that were socially and culturally unusually disconnected. Before the turn of the 
fifteenth century socialisation of outsider mamlūks had predominantly happened in contexts of 
dynastic differentiation, shaped by the effects of the disciplinary arrangements of the sultans al-
Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb, Qalāwūn or Barqūq and their entourages and successors, which had integrated these 
outsiders of servile origins automatically into webs of social practices and cultural meanings that 
appeared as dynastically connected.83 Between 1412 and 1468 the lack of structural dynastic effects 
to appear from social practice precluded similar social boundaries from being created across 
generations, affiliations, ethnic categories, kinship ties, and related identities. The ongoing practical 
process of elite reproduction, integration, segmentation, and fragmentation thus happened 
increasingly in a context in which the absence of any dynastic appearances created room for 
alternative symbolic narratives that could produce the structuring boundaries of political order, 
social distinction and legitimate sovereignty in the Dawlat al-Atrāk. Next to the often short-lived 
arrangements and structural effects of a sultan’s actual power, authority and claims to political 
order, fragmented elite groups and individuals were invited to construct, produce and reproduce 
arrangements that created more transcendent effects of political community and social identity, and 
of legitimating continuity, which enabled to connect different social orders and their varying roles 
within them in non-dynastic ways. 84  In this particular context the practical disciplinary 
arrangements of the time enabled the discursive claiming of new particular historical truths and the 
invention of adapted genealogical traditions of one, long-standing and continuous political order 
that connected and explained a socio-culturally fragmented political present through the memory of 
a shared and glorious political past. In this endless process of structuring the near and wider world 
as a meaningful place and space, the memories of the dynastic orders that had been predominant in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (and that remained so anywhere else in West-Asia) were all 
but obliterated. At the same time, one of these new truths and traditions may well haven been 
created in the format of a new layer of Mamluk socio-political meaning, of a shared and glorious 
                                               
82 See the references above, in footnotes 71 & 76, and especially Sievert, Der Herrscherwechsel im Mamlukenreich; 
summarised in idem, “Der Kampf um die Macht im Mamlūkenreich des 15. Jahrhunderts”; idem, “Family, friend or 
foe?”, 109-17. 
83  For an example of this dynamic dynastic ‘socialisation’ in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see Van 
Steenbergen, “Ritual, Politics and the City in Mamluk Cairo”. In this context, it is relevant to also refer to the fact that 
Loiseau captured the —for him— political essence of the period 1250-1290 under the title “Le règne de la maison d’al-
Salih” and that of the period 1290-1382 as “Le temps des Qalawunides” (Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, 112, 118). 
84 A good example of this is the process of Circassian ‘ethnicisation’ of political identities that was posited by Loiseau 
as appearing and growing more and more powerful from the turn of the fifteenth century onwards (Loiseau, Les 
Mamelouks, 173-200; see also above, footnote 64). 
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past rooted in servile origins and successful thirteenth-century mamlūk leaderships. This 
‘Mamlukisation’ of fifteenth-century Syro-Egyptian political order emanating from the Cairo 
citadel may even have proven so powerful a structural effect of those arrangements that created the 
continued appearance of the Dawlat al-Atrāk, that even modern scholarship was affected by it. 
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